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CHAPTER 9 
Civil Practice and Procedure 
JOHN E. BOWMAN, JR. • 
§ 9.1. Long-Ann Jurisdiction. In Carlson Corp. v. University of Ver-
mont1 the Supreme Judicial Court extended the expansive interpretation of 
the Massachusetts long-arm statute given a year earlier in Good Hope In-
dustries, Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co. 2 In Carlson, the Court held that jurisdic-
tion over the person can be based on an isolated contact between the 
University and Massachusetts-the fact that the contract between the par-
ties was signed in Boston. 3 The decision, as the Court candidly acknowl-
edged, reaches the "outer limits" 4 of the restraints imposed by the due pro-
cess clause' on a state's power to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant. While Carlson may satisfy recent Supreme Court decisions curtail-
ing the extraterritorial reach of state court jurisdiction, 6 the decision is 
nevertheless fraught with difficulties. 
Three requirements must be met for a Massachusetts court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a non-consenting, 7 nonresident defendant. First, the 
defendant must be given notice that the lawsuit is pending. The notice re-
• JOHN E. BOWMAN, JR. is Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Trial Ad-
vocacy Program at Boston University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
research assistance provided by Denise M. Provost. 
§ 9.1 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 659, 402 N.E.2d 483. 
' 378 Mass. 1, 389 N.E.2d 76 (1979). Good Hope Industries held that a Texas corporation 
was "transacting any business" in Massachusetts and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Massachusetts courts under G.L. c. 223A, § 3(a), the same provision of the long-arm statute at 
issue in Carlson. The decision rested on reports the defendant sent to the plaintiff in 
Massachusetts (which were the basis for the lawsuit), telephone calls to the.plaintiff, the sub-
mission of monthly invoices to the plaintiff in Massachusetts, and payment for the reports 
drawn from Massachusetts bank accounts. /d. at 9-10, 389 N.E.2d at 81-82. The case is 
discussed in Wodlinger & Kaplan, Civil Practice and Procedure, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW 
§ 9.1. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 663,402 N.E.2d.at 485. 
• /d. at 660 n.2, 402 N.E.2d at 484 n.2. 
' U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
• See note 33 infra. 
' The defendant's consent satisfies all jurisdictional requirements for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the person. See, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 
311 (1964). Cf. MASS. R. CIV. P. 12(h), F'Eo. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(failure to assert lack of jurisdic-
tion over person waives objection.) 
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quirement, which has- both constitutional' and statutory' elements, is 
satisfied in most cases and consequently does not merit further discussion./ 
Second, the case must fit within one of the categories listed in the 
Massachusetts long-arm statute, chapter 223A. In Carlson, for example, the 
question was whether the defendant was "transacting any business" in 
Massachusetts under section 3(a) of the long-.;mn statute. 10 Third, the exer-
cise of jurisdiction must not exceed the constitutional boundaries prescribed 
by the due process clause. Under the widely-known decision in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, due process requires "minimum contacts" be-
tween the defendant and the forum state. 11 In most cases the attention of 
both counsel and the court focuses on the constitutional test to the virtual 
exclusion of the first two requirements. The reason the "minimum 
contacts" test dominates the analysis is that the Supreme Judicial Court has 
interpreted the "transacting any business" provision in the Massachusetts 
long-arm statute to extend to the "limits allowed by the Constitution of the 
United States." 12 
The "minimum contacts" test, as the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized, is "not susceptible of mechanical application; 
rather the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the re-
' E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950H"An 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and af-
ford them an opportunity to present their objections."); Kulko v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
• E.g., G.L. c. 223A, §§ 4, 6-8; c. 227, § 1. In Carlson, service of process on the University 
was made by certified mail pursuant to G.L. c. 223A, § 6. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 659, 402 
N.E.2d at 483. 
'" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 659-60,402 N.E.2d at 483. G.L. c. 223A, § 3 also provides that a 
Massachusetts court may exercise personal jurisdictio11 over a nonresident defendant if the 
cause of action "aris[es) from ... (b) contracting to supply services in this commonwealth; 
(c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth; ... (d) causing tor-
tious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he 
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or 
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this com-
monwealth .... " 
" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("due process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with it [the 
forum) such that the maintenance Gf the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice' "). The Supreme Court has recently extended the minimum contacts 
test beyond in personam jurisdiction to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, saying,'' ... all 
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and its progeny." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), overruling 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also Rush v. Savchuk 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (state 
court cannot assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendant by garnishing insurance policy 
within forum state). 
12 "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. 441, 443, 280 N.E.2d 
423, 424 (1972); Good Hope Industries, 378 Mass. at 6, 389 N.E.2d at 79; ("two questions tend 
to converge"); Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 660 n.2, 402 N.E.2d at 484 n.2. 
2
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quisite 'affiliating circumstances' are present." 13 In Carlson, however, the 
parties did not heed this admonition about the significance of the underly-
ing facts in determining whether the minimum contacts test was satisfied. 
The case, as the Carlson opinion pointedly remarks, was presented to the 
Court on an "extremely poor" record which provided "only the bare 
minimum of information necessary to decide the issue." 14 Carlson thus 
stands in marked contrast to the extensive factual record in the Good Hope 
Industries case. The latter case was decided on the basis of affidavits, 
depositions, and exhibits filed in the superior court after a period of pretrial 
discovery limited to the jurisdictional issue. 15 While Good Hope Industries 
points to no single contact between the defendant and Massachusetts 
arguably as significant as signing a contract in the state, the "factual con-
stellation" detailed in the opinion16 makes a more persuasive case for the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant than does the record in 
Carlson. The result in Carlson is thus somewhat surprising in light of the 
Court's prior assertions that "plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing suf-
ficient facts on which to predicate jurisdiction over the defendant." 17 To 
some degree, the sparse record in Carlson even worked to the defendant's 
detriment. The opinion disposes of a portion of the "minimum contacts" 
test:._whether the exercise of jurisdiction would "offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice' " 18-by saying that the "record 
lacks sufficient facts bearing on the issue whether the defendant would be 
unduly burdened by being required to defend this suit in Massachusetts." 19 
The following picture of the Carlson litigation emerges from the opinion. 
The Carlson Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation with its principal 
place of business in the state, sued the University of Vermont for the 
" Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The Supreme Court went 
on to say that in this area "few answers will be written 'in black and white. The greys are domi-
nant and even among them the shades are innumerable.' " Id. (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 
U.S. 541, 545 (1948)). In the Good Hope Industries opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
the exercise of long-arm jurisdictions is "sensitive to the facts of each case.'' 378 Mass. at 2, 
389 N.E.2d at 78. 
14 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 660 n.2, 402 N.E.2d at 484 n.2. 
" Good Hope Industries, 378 Mass. at 2-3, 389 N.E.2d at 77-78. 
16 378 Mass. at 6, 389 N.E.2d at 80. 
" Id. at 3, 389 N.E.2d at 78; Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 
151, 376 N.E.2d 548, 549 (1978). See also Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 661 n.4, 402 N.E.2d 
at 484 n.4. 
" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 
(1940)). 
" Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 666,485 N.E.2d at 487. Cf. Doe v. Roe, 377 Mass. 616, 
620, 387 N.E.2d 143, 145 (court's conclusion that plaintiff would not be unduly inconvenienc-
ed by litigation in New Hampshire apparently based on inference from slight evidence in 
record). Read together, the Carlson and Good Hope Industries decisions indicate that an ob-
jection to jurisdiction over the person can rarely be decided on the basis of an unadorned mo-
tion to dismiss under MASS. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(2). Compare MASS. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(4) (insuffi-
ciency of process) and 12(b)(5) (insufficiency of service of process). 3
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balance due on a contract under which the plaintiff was cahstructing a 
university building in Burlington, Vermont. The appellate record reflected 
an almost complete lack of contacts between the defendant, the University, 
and the forum, Massachusetts. The University had no offices in 
Massachusetts, nor did it own any real estate or offer any courses in 
Massachusetts. In addition there is no reference in the opinion to the 
presence of any University agents or employees in Massachusetts. 20 
The Court relied on an isolated act in Massachusetts-the signing of the 
construction contract-to satisfy both the statutory "transacting any 
business" test and the constitutional "minimum contacts" test. Notably, 
the execution of the contract is devoid of other contacts between the Univer-
sity and Massachusetts. The University, for example, did not solicit bids for 
the construction contract in Massachusetts, either directly or by publica-
tion. Instead, the Carlson Corporation initiated contact with the University 
by a small number of telephone calls and letters. Apart from saying that the 
Carlson Corporation hand-delivered the "prequalification documents" in 
Vermont, the opinion provides no detail as to the negotiations over the con-
tract. Apparently the final design proposal was also delivered to Vermont, 
and a special University review panel met in Vermont to select the contrac-
tor. The Court's opinion, quite correctly, does not suggest that these factors 
associated with the solicitation or negotiation of the contract meet the 
"minimum contacts" standard. 21 
Performance of the contract also took place in Vermont. The building 
itself was constructed in Vermont, and circumstances related to perfor-
mance which have justified the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants in other cases were absent. The University's con-
struction supervisor, for example, did not meet in Massachusetts with 
Carlson's representatives. Instead, daily meetings were held at the Vermont 
Shifting the burden of producing evidence to the defendant is not inappropriate if, as the 
Supreme Judicial Court does, one views International Shoe as establishing a multilayered 
jurisdictional test. Under this view the plaintiff must first demonstrate compliance with Inter-
national Shoe's threshold requirement ("minimum contacts," or the defendant's "purposeful 
activity" in the forum state). The court may then consider the balance of inconvenience bet-
ween the parties under International Shoe's second prong (whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "). See note 11 supra. 
The defendant will, in any event, want to produce evidence on the related forum non conven-
iens issue. See text following note 63 infra. Note, however, that "considerations of fairness" 
between the parties cannot substitute for contacts between the defendant and the forum state. 
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332(1980). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). Cf Note, Long Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: 
When is a Contract a Contact, 61 B.U. L. REv. 375, 382-384 (1981) (three-step, sequential 
jurisdictional test). 
20 Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 659-61, 402 N.E.2d at 483-84. 
21 /d. at 660-61, 402 N.E.2d at 483-84. Cf. Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 
Mass. 149, 15J, 376 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1978). 
4
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construction site. 22 Carlson did not perform any of the work on the project 
in Massachusetts. Payment also took place in Vermont, as Carlson mailed 
invoices to the University and the checks were mailed from Vermont. 23 
Ironically, as the opinion points out, the contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant was signed in Boston in order to "accomodate" third par-
ties-officials of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
and U.S. Office of Education-whose involvement was limited to financing 
the construction. There is no suggestion, however, that the financing was 
pertinent to the plaintiff's breach of contract action, and the Court did not 
rely on the contacts between these federal officials and Massachusetts as the 
basis for asserting jurisdiction over the University. 24 
Before it reached the constitutional issue the Court dealt summarily with 
the statutory coverage issue. Section 3(a) of the long-arm statute permits 
Massachusetts courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
"as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's transact-
ing any business in this commonwealth." Deciding that the case satisfied 
section 3(a)'s requirements, the opinion merely states that "[t]here can be 
no doubt that physically signing a contract in Massachusetts is, in literal 
terms, transacting business in Massachusetts, if the cause of action arises 
from that contract. " 25 Although the transacting business provision was also 
read expansively in the Good Hope Industries decision, the approach 
adopted by the Court in Carlson and Good Hope Industries departs from 
the more restrictive interpretations of section 3(a) in earlier decisions. In 
Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., for example, the Court held 
that an "isolated transaction" did not satisfy the long-arm statute. 26 
Similarly, in "Automatic, Sprinkler Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp. the 
Court stated that ~'affirming a -contract" was not transacting business 
within the meaning of section 3(a). 27 While only in Carlson did the contract 
signing ceremony take place in Massachusetts, Droukas and "Automatic, 
" Contrast Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973), a 
diversity of citizenship case where the court upheld jurisdiction under G.L. c. 223A, § 3(a), 
over one defendant in a breach of contract action where the plaintiff's production took place in 
Massachusetts and the defendant "either actively supervised or actually participated" in pro-
duction of the product, but denied jurisdiction over two other nonresident defendants who 
were "passive purchasers." /d. at 1083, 1084. See also Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Moun-
tain State Construction Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 
(1980) (performance of contract alone in forum state insufficient contact); Anderson v. 
Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036 (lOth Cir. 1971) (same). See also cases cited in note 58, infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 661-62, 402 N.E.2dat 484-85. 
•• /d. at 661, 402 N.E.2d at 484. 
" /d. at 662, 402 N.E.2d at 485. 
26 375 Mass. 149, 154, 376 N.E.2d 548, SSO (1978). 
" 361 Mass. at 445, 280 N.E.2d at 424. See also Vencedor Manufacturing Co. v. Gougher 
Industries, 557 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1977); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 
1079 (1st Cir. 1973). 
5
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Sprinkler do suggest that the Court's most recent interpretation of the reach 
of section 3(a) is not free from doubt. 21 
The second, and more significant, issue raised by Carlson is whether the 
result in Carlson satisfies the ''minimum contacts'' requirement imposed by 
the due process clause. 29 Whether the execution of a single contract within a 
state is a "minimum contact" sufficient to justify assertion of jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant is a question tha:t has "deeply divided" both 
federal and state courts. 30 A recent "analysis of the conflicting positions of 
the federal courts of appeals" concluded that the "mere act of entering into 
a contract with a resident of the forum [state] does not constitute purpose-
ful activity in the constitutional sense. 0031 The Supreme Court recently de-
' clined to address this question, 32 and prediction of the future course of its 
decisions in this area is a perilous undertaking. The Supreme Court has, 
however, rendered four major decisions on extraterritorial assertions of 
jurisdiction in the past four years, each time striking down state court asser-
tions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 33 At the very least, the 
trend and tenor of these decisions cast doubt on the correctness of the con-
stitutional conclusion reached in the Carlson case. 
" Good Hope Industries distinguishes Droukas and "Automatic" Sprinkler. 378 Mass. at 
8, 389 N.E.2d at 80-81. 
" The state court's interpretation of section 3(a) is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Cf. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935) (no jurisdiction to 
review state court decision based on an adequate and independent state ground). 
•• Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909 
(1980) and cases cited (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See generally Currie, 
The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. 
F. 533, 563 (cases "frequently asserted that isolated transaction by a foreign corporation did 
not constitute 'doing 'business' within the State"); Developments in The Law-State Court 
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 926 (1960) (isolated contract "more difficult" jurisdic-
tional problem because "[u]nlike a tort, which can usually be localized, a contract is likely to 
involve more than one state in its negotiation, execution, and performance"); Annot., 62 L. 
Ed. 2d 853 (1980). 
" Note, Long Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 
61 B.U. L. REv. 375, 384 (1981). See also Note, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Con-
tacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1348-49 (1980) 
("gray area of single contacts"). 
" Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980). 
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 440 
U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186 (1977). These decisions have spawned a rush of academic commentary. The more 
recent publications include Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State 
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77; Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of 
Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REv. 429 (1981); Louis, The Grasp of Long 
Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 408 (1980); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, 
and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 N.W.U. L. REv. 1112 (1981). For a 
seminal article predating the decisions see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 241. 
6
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Carlson, as is customary, resorts to the Supreme Court's 19S7 decision in 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 34 to support jurisdiction based 
on the execution of an isolated contract in the forum state. 35 McGee must be 
read, however, in light of the cautionary note sounded by the Supreme 
Court only six months later in Hanson v. Denckla where the Court said that 
it is a "mistake to assume that this trend [of expanding personal jurisdiction 
over nonresidents] heralds. the eventual demise of all restrictions on the per-
sonal jurisdiction of state courts. " 36 This admonition deserves serious con-
sideration in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions which appear to 
infuse new life into Hanson v. Denckla. 37 Hence, the Supreme Judicial 
Court may have unduly relied on McGee, especially since McGee can be 
distinguished from Carlson. In McGee, the plaintiff's son, a resident of 
California (the forum state), purchased a life insurance policy from an out-
of-state company. The defendant insurer subsequently mailed a reinsurance 
certificate into California which the insured accepted in California, and 
premium payments were mailed to the defendant from California. 38 Thus, 
McGee adds the elements of solicitation and payment, which were absent in 
Carlson, to the formation of the contract within the forum state. 39 In addi-
tion, the insurance company in McGee apparently conducted interstate 
business on a widespread basis, even though it had only isolated contacts 
with California. In contrast, nothing in Carlson suggests the University of 
Vermont should be treated like a nationwide enterprise. 40 
" 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based 
on a contract which had substantial connection with that State"). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664, 665, 402 N.E.2d at 486: 
" 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). The "trend" was set forth in McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23, 
" E.g., World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293-94 (discussed in connection with assertion 
that Court has "never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional 
purposes"); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 215-16. See also Ander-
son v. Shifflet, 435 F.2d 1036 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
" McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22. See Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664 n.7, 402 N.E.2d at 
486 n.7. 
" The facts in McGee also illustrate the difficulty in many cases of identifying a single locus 
where the contract was made. See Droukas, 375 Mass. at 151, 157, 376 N.E.2d at 549-50, 553; 
''Automatic" Sprinkler, 361 Mass. at 444-45, 280 N.E.2d at 425. Cf. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 
U.S. at 328 ("fictional presence" of insurance policy within state insufficient contact). 
•• McGee, 355 U.S. 223. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. Whether Carlson 
should have been decided differently because a state university-not a business corpora-
tion-was the defendant will not be discussed because it is an infrequent situation. See 
"Automatic" Sprinkler, 361 Mass. at 446, 280 N.E.2d at 426 ("We see a distinction ... 
because of the nature of interstate insurance business where such insurers commonly choose to 
do business across State lines.") In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Supreme Court 
held a state has no constitutional immunity from suit in the courts of a sister state. Nevada v. 
Hall was a tort action arising out of a car accident in California involving a car owned by 
Nevada and driven by an employee of the state university, so there was no question that suffi-
cient "minimum contacts" existed between the defendants (which included the State of 
Nevada and the University of Nevada) and the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over the per-
son. 
7
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More importantly, recent Supreme Court decisions have emphasized that 
a decisive factor in McGee was that California had expressed, by statute, a 
special interest in asserting in personam jurisdiction over nonresident in-
surers. These decisions also suggest that general long-arm statutes, such as 
the Massachusetts statute involved in Carlson, do not carry special weight in 
assaying the constitutionally required "minimum contacts. " 41 The Carlson 
result thus may not be supported by McGee. 
Interestingly enough, the distinction between special and general long-
arm statutes drawn by recent Supreme Court decisions also accords with 
prior Massachusetts authority. In Wolfman v. Modern Life Insurance Co. 42 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over a New 
York insurer on facts analogous to those in McGee. Wolfman, further-
more, was expressly distinguished in "Automatic" Sprinkler where, as in 
Carlson, the plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under the "transacting any 
business" provision in the general long-arm statute, chapter 223A, section 
3(a). In "Automatic" Sprinkler, the Court held there was no jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant but it justified the contrary result in 
Wolfman, which rested on "only the barest of contacts with the State," 
saying that the "insurance field lend[s] itself to the furthest extension of 
jurisdiction based on an isolated contact."43 This special treatment of the 
insurance industry is, as the Court appeared to recognize, 44 reflected in the 
particularized interests asserted by Massachusetts in the Unauthorized In-
surer's Process Act, chapter 175B, section 2, which was involved in 
Wolfman. This specificity of interests contrasts sharply with the general in-
terest in asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants expressed in the 
long-arm statute, chapter 223A, section 3, which led to a different result in 
"Automatic" Sprinkler. Carlson thus appears not to be supported by either 
Wolfman or "Automatic" Sprinkler. 
" Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98 (California has not asserted "particularized interest'' by enacting 
"special jurisdictional statute"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 214, 216 (Delaware legislature 
has not asserted interest). 
42 352 Mass. 356, 367, 225 N.E.2d 598, 606 (1967). 
•• "Automatic" Sprinkler, 361 Mass. at 446, 280 N.E.2d at 426. 
•• ld. Nevertheless, the constitutional distinction between the two types of statutes is dif-
ficult to grasp, especially where a state's general long-arm statute extends either expressly (see 
CALIF. CoDE C1v. PRoc. § 410.10), or by judicial interpretation (see ''Automatic" Sprinkler, 
361 Mass. at 443, 280 N.E.2d at 424) to the limits imposed by the due process clause. World-
Wide Volkswagen's explanation that a foreign corporation is entitled to "clear notice" that it 
is subject to suit in the forum state may justify the distinction but it does not fully explain why 
the notice must be given by the state legislature rather than by the judiciary, especially since 
even a particularized statutory assertion of jurisdiction can only supplement-but not 
replace.::..Contacts between the defendant and the forum state. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 
at 322 &: n.3, 324, 327-329. The distinction may also produce anomalous results. For example, 
if Massachusetts and California both closely regulate the insurance industry, why-as a matter 
of constitutional law-should a Massachusetts court be able to assert long-arm jurisdiction 
over a nonresident insurance company under its particularized statute, G.L. c. 175B, §2, while 
8
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It is far from clear that the United States Supreme Court would agree 
with the result reached in Carlson. Distinctions which may be drawn be-
tween McGee and Carlson-whether based on the facts, the underlying 
long-arm statute, or the nature of the defendant's business-do not neces-
sarily ordain a different result. They do, however, suggest the likelihood 
that a contemporary Supreme Court decision would curtail the extrater-
ritorial reach of state court jurisdiction in Carlson-type fact patterns. 
Moreover, there are dicta in Supreme Court decisions distinguishing "con-
tinuous and systematic" contacts between a nonresident and the forum 
state, which justify the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, from "single or 
isolated" contacts, which do not. 45 Carlson also fails to reflect the renewed 
emphasis in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson that the "primary 
concern" under the "minimum contacts" test is the burden imposed on the 
defendant by being compelled to litigate in a "distant or inconvenient 
forum. " 46 
Other factors, in addition to signing the contract in Massachusetts, ao-
vanced in Carlson to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the University 
also lose some of their force when considered in light of the Supreme 
Court's renewed emphasis on the "relationship among the defendant, the 
forum and the litigation. " 47 Carlson refers, for example, to the "interest of 
the forum state,'' which the World-Wide Volkswagen decision does include 
in a list of factors to be considered. 48 That interest has not, however, 
prevailed in any recent decision by the Supreme Court. In Kulko v. Superior 
Court, for example, the Supreme Court held the California courts lacked 
jurisdiction over the absent father to hear a suit to modify child support 
payments where both the plaintiff (the mother) and her children were 
California domiciliaries. The Court recognized that California has 
"substantial interests" in "protecting the welfare of its minor residents." 
The Court nevertheless held that jurisdiction over the person could be 
a California court could not under its general statute, CALIF. ConE C1v. PRoc. § 410.10, 
supra? 
., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. E.g., id. at 318, 320; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92, 93, 97; 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 297. 
•• World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. World-Wide Volkswagen then enumerates 
other factors considered under the "minimum contacts" test which could be used to justify an 
expansive assertion of jurisdiction over the person. The reach of these factors is limited by 
what World-Wide Volkswagen saw as the second function of the "minimum contacts" test: 
" ... to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed 
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." /d. See also Hanson v. Den-
ckla, 357 U.S. at 251 ("territorial limitations"). 
47 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204. World-Wide Volkswagen demonstrates the relation-
ship between the forum and the litigation is insufficient: the Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdic-
tion even though the accident occured in Oklahoma. 444 U.S. at 295, 299. 
•• Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh., at 665,402 N.E.2d at 487; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 292. See note 46 supra. 
9
Bowman: Chapter 9: Civil Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
338 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 9.1 
predicated only on the "defendant's activity."49 California's interests in 
providing a forum in Kulko seem more substantial than Massachusetts' in-
terest in the breach of contract action against the University of Vermont, 
and the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in Carlson is correspondingly 
weaker. Furthermore, caution is advisable in relying, as Carlson does, 50 on 
the "forum State's manifest interest in providing an effective means of 
redress." This factor is drawn from McGee51 and, as discussed above, the 
underlying considerations in McGee are distinguishable from those in 
Carlson. 52 
Carlson's reliance on the "substantial commercial consequence" in 
Massachusetts of the contract between the University and the Carlson Cor-
poration 53 is also questionable in light of the Kulko decision. Kulko rejected 
the justification for jurisdiction advanced by the C!Wfornia Supreme Court: 
that the defendant had caused an "effect in the State by an act or omission 
outside the State.'' 54 While Kulko did suggest that an in-state effect based 
on a "commercial benefit from solicitation of business from a resident" 
might justify a different result," the continued viability of such a distinc-
tion was drawn into question by the later decision. in World- Wide 
Volkswagen. In that case the Supreme Court assumed it was "foreseeable" 
that cars sold by the defendants in the New York area would end up in 
Oklahoma and that the sellers derived "substantial revenue" from the use 
of the cars in Oklahoma. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held, the 
Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate products liabilities claims 
arising from accidents which occurred in Oklahoma. 56 Carlson is vulnerable 
•• Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92, 86, 98, 100. Notably, however, the separation agreement between 
the parties in Kulko was executed in New York, not California. Jd. at 87. Compare Ross v. 
Ross, 371 Mass. 439, 441-442, 358 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1976) (execution of separation agreement 
in forum state or use of its courts justifies long-arm jurisdiction), distinguished in Carlson, 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664 n.9, 402 N.E.2d at 486 n.9 (state has greater interest in separation 
agreements than in commercial contracts). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 665, 402 N.E.2d at 487. 
" McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. See Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. 
L. REv. 872, 875 (1980) ("current view that state interests are simply insufficient ... if 
minimum contacts with the defendant are absent"). 
" McGee was concerned that out-of-state insurers would, in effect, be "judgment proof" 
because "[w]hen claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not af-
ford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum .... " It also felt "crucial witnesses" 
were likely to be in the insured's state. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. Carlson, by contrast, involved 
a very large contract in terms of the ''time and money involved'' and witnesses were likely to be 
in Vermont. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664, 402 N.E.2d at 486. By comparison with McGee, the 
burdens of suing the University in a Vermont court seem slight. 
" Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664, 402 N.E.2d at 486. 
" Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89, 96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFL!Cf OF LAWS§§ 37, 50 
(1971). 
" 436 U.S. at 97. 
" World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 298, 288. The Court did not consider these 
factors "wholly irrelevant" but emphasized they must "stem from a constitutionally 
10
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at this point because, like the Oklahoma court, it relied heavily on the 
"amount of time and money involved" under the construction contract 
with the University. H The presence of additional factors would, however, 
appear to justify the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction-for example, if 
performance took place in Massachusetts or if Massachusetts residents were 
a significant part of the work force. 58 
Despite these doubts, Carlson may have properly concluded that the 
"minimum contacts" test was satisfied. The opinion's strength lies in its 
emphasis that signing the contract in Massachusetts was an "affirmative, 
intentional act" by the University which, because it required the defendant's 
"physical presence" in Massachusetts, meant that it was "within the univer-
sity's power to refuse to 'transact any business' in Massachusetts." 59 
Moreover, the nexus between the purpose of the University's presence in 
Massachusetts-to sign the contract-and the gravamen of the lawsuit is 
not attenuated. Under the circumstances it may not be unreasonable to con-
clude, as the Supreme Court restated the test in World- Wide Volkswagen, 
that the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there." 60 World-
Wide Volkswagen indicated that a purpose of the "minimum contacts" test 
cognizable contact" between the defendant and the forum state: a "collateral relationship" is 
not sufficient. Jd. at 297, 299. Of course, the element of solicitation within the forum 
state-adverted to in Kulko-was missing in World- Wide Volkswagen, but it is also missing in 
Carlson. See text at note 21 supra. See also Kulko 436 U.S. at 92, 94 (defendant's "glancing 
presence" in forum state and "financial benefit" insufficient). 
World-Wide Volkswagen's citation, with apparent approval, of a decision upholding the 
assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in another products liability case, Gray v. American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), may require 
qualification of the statement in the text. The apparent distinction is that in Gray the defend-
ant's interstate business was sufficiently substantial to warrant the conclusion that it "delivers 
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State," while the defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen sold their 
cars only in the New York area (and the plaintiffs then drove the cars to Oklahoma). World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. See Gray, 22 111.2d at 440, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (use of de-
fendant's product in Illinois not "isolated instance''). The "stream of commerce" qualifica-
tion, however, has no application to the University of Vermont. 
'' Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 664, 402 N.E.2d at 486. Accord Thos. P. Gonzalez 
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion de Puerto Rico, 614 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(no jurisdiction in breach of contract action where out-of-state act imposed "economic 
burden" on forum resident). But see In-Flight Devices Corp. v. VanDusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 
220, 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1972) Gurisdiction where stop payment on $200,000 contract had 
"substantial consequences" in forum state). 
" E.g., Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (lOth Cir. 1979); Iowa Electric 
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979). But see note 22 supra. 
,. Carlson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 662, 665, 667, 402 N.E.2d at 485, 487. Contrast, e.g., the 
facts in Droukas where the defendant (the seller) placed an advertisement in a magazine 
distributed in Massachusetts and sent a letter to the plaintiff in Massachusetts confirming the 
plaintiff's purchase order. Droukas, 375 Mass. at 151, 376 N.E.2d at 549. 
•• World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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is to allow potential defendants to structure their forums in which they can 
be sued. 61 Carlson may pass constitutional muster when the decision is ap-
proached from this perspective because its focal point is the presence of the 
University, and not of the contract in Massachusetts. 62 Furthermore, recent 
Supreme Court decisions only curtail the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction; 
they do not portend reinstatement of the rule that state court in personam 
jurisdiction depends on the defendant's presence within the forum state. 63 
In any event, doubts about the correctness of the Supreme Judicial 
Court's decision under the "minimum contacts" test may never be resolved 
because application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is likely to 
avoid constitutionally based decisions by Massachusetts courts in such close 
cases in the future. In both Good Hope lndustries64 and Carlson65 the Court 
addressed only the permissible reach of in personam jurisdiction under the 
state's long-arm statute and the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause. It did not decide whether the Massachusetts courts should, as a mat-
ter of discretion, decline to exercise the jurisdiction. A footnote to the 
Carlson opinion firmly stated, however, that the Court would no longer 
countenance "piecemeal appeals" of long-arm jurisdiction questions and 
that lower courts should assure that any forum non conveniens considera-
tions are addressed first. 66 Because a dismissal on forum non conveniens 
grounds is "dispositive of the question whether the plaintiff's case should 
be heard in Massachusetts," 67 the Court's instruction to shift the order in 
which the two issues are taken up can avoid the need to decide the constitu-
tional question whether there are "minimum contacts" between the defend-
ant and the forum. 68 
The Supreme Judicial Court's major exposition of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens appears in Universal Adjus1ment Corp. V. Midland Bank, 
Ltd. where the Court said that: 
" /d. The opinion's reference to "primary conduct" evokes (without citation) Professors 
Hart and Wechsler's comments on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in their casebooks, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSI"EM, 634-35 (1st ed. 1953); 714-15 (2d. ed. 1973) (Bator, ed.). 
·~ Contrast Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 209 ("presence of the property alone" in forum 
state insufficient); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 328, 329, 324 ("fictional presence" of defend-
ant's insurance policy in forum state was "competely adventitious"; no jurisdiction absent 
"voluntary activity" by defendant in forum state). 
" E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714(1877). Pennoyer did, however, permit a state to 
assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business in the state. /d. at 735-36. See note 
11 supra. 
•• 378 Mass. at 13 & h.20, 389 N.E.2d at 83 & n.20. 
" i980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 666 n.lO, 402 N.E.2d at 487 n.lO . 
.. /d. 
"/d. 
" On the desirability of avoiding unnecessary constit\ltional decisions. see Mr. Justice 
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 
(1936). See also Siler v. Louisville &Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S.l75 (1909). For a contrary view 
see, School Comm: of Springfield v. Board of Education, 366 Mass. 315, 339, 319 N.E.2d 427, 
· 441 (1974) (Tauro, C.J.). 
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Where it appears that complete justice cannot be done here, that the 
defendant will be subjected to great and unnecessary inconvenience 
and expense, and that the trial will be attended, if conducted here, 
with many if not insuperable difficulties which all would be avoided 
without special hardship to the plaintiff if proceedings are brought in 
the jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled, where services can 
be had, where the cause of action arose and where justice can be done, 
our courts decline to take jurisdiction on the general ground that the 
litigation may more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal. 
Stated succinctly, the principle is that where in a broad sense the ends 
of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be more suitably 
tried elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be declined and the parties 
relegated to relief to be sought in another forum. 69 
More recently, in Doe v. Roe, the Court gave added impetus to resort to 
forum non conveniens by stating that the "whole trend of the law" is to pay 
more attention to "functional or pragmatic considerations about com-
parative advantages of one forum over another. "'0 In that case the Court 
declined to decide the constitutional question whether the Massachusetts 
courts had jurisdiction over the person and deferred to the New Hampshire 
courts. 71 If the forum non conveniens issue had been presented in Carlson, 
it seems likely that the Court would have concluded that similar deference 
to the Vermont courts was warranted. 
Brief examination of the choice of law (or conflicts) question-whether 
Massachusetts or Vermont law will govern the Carlson Corporation's 
breach of contract action-lends further perspective to the jurisdictional 
issue. Although this question was not before the Court, the decision of the 
jurisdictional issue in Carlson may have been unconsciously influenced by 
choice of law principles. To date, Massachusetts has applied the "law of the 
place where the contract was made. " 72 Accordingly, ascertaining the locus 
of the contract is important for choice of law purposes even if it is entitled 
to less weight under the ''minimum contacts'' test. Furthermore, conflation 
of the conflicts and jurisdiction issues would not be surprising for the pur-
69 281 Mass. 303, 313, 184 N.E. 152, 158 (1933) (quoted in full in New Amsterdam Casualty 
Co. v. Estes, 353 Mass. 90,94-95,228 N.E.2d 440,443 (1967)). See also G.L. c. 223A, § 5. The 
latter opinion did state, however, that the plaintiff's choice of forum should "rarely" be 
disturbed unless the "balance is strongly in favor of the defendant." 353 Mass. at 95, 228 
N.E.2d at 443 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)). See also Universal 
Adjustment Corp., 281 Mass. at 315, 184 N.E. at 159 (apply doctrine "with caution"). 
70 377 Mass. at 619, 387 N.E.2d at 145 (quoted with approval in Murphy v. MurJ>hy, 198(} 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 1031, 404 N.E.2d 69, 72 (exercise of jurisdiction in child custody case is 
"in no sense mandatory")). -
" 377 Mass. at 620, 387 N.E.2d at 145. 
" Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 540,392 N.E.2d 1045, 1048. 
See note 76, irifra. The Massachusetts rule accords with the first RESTATEMENfOFCONFLICfOF 
LAWS§ 332 (1934) ("law of the place of contracting"). But see id. at§ 358 ("law of the place of 
performance"). 
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poses of constitutional_ analysis, because the federal constitutional limits im-
posed on the state courts in both areas are quite similar. 73 The Supreme 
Court, nevertheless, has always differentiated the two issues. 74 In Kulko, 
for· example, the Supreme Court held that the California courts could not 
exercise jurisdiction over the father, a New York resident. The opinion sug-
gested, however, that California law might apply in the New York courts. 75 
This differentiation between the appropriate forum and the applicable law 
derives, in part, from the fact that when the Supreme Court reviews state 
court choice of law decisions it often looks to the contacts between the 
plaintiff and the forum. By contrast, in jurisdiction cases the focus is on the 
defendant-forum contacts. 76 Thus, execution of the contract between the 
University and the Carlson Corporation, a domestic corporation, in 
Massachusetts is a constitutionally sufficient contact to justify (but not to 
require) use of Massachusetts contract law, but this conclusion does not ip-
so facto justify the assertion of jurisdiction over the University. 
Choice of law considerations may,· however, appropriately bolster a deci-
sion to remit the parties to the Vermont courts under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. Under the modern "interest analysis" approach to con-
flicts questions it is probable that Vermont contract law will be applied to 
the Carlson case wherever it is litigated. 77 Although Massachusetts courts 
are competent to apply foreign law to cases before them, the added burden 
this places on the judicial system may suggest that the court should decline, 
as a matter of discretion, to exercise in personam jurisdiction and dismiss 
the case. In particular, the burden of applying foreign law may become a 
decisive factor favoring dismissal in cases where the normal burden is com-
pounded by the difficulty of correctly ascertaining the foreign law rule. The 
" The fourteenth amendment's due process clause applies to both. In addition, the full faith 
and credit clause, U.S. CONSTITUTION art. IV, § 1, applies to choice of law cases. See generally 
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 18 MICH. L. REv. 872 (1980). 
74 The recent holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981), rejects 
Professor Martin's argument, 78 MICHL. REV. at 872, 883, that the "minimum contacts" test 
should be applied in both personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law cases. 
" Ku/ko, 436 U.S. at 98 (California is "center of gravity"). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. at 254; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 215-16; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
294. In Rush v. Savchuk the plaintiff's unsuccessful effort to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Minnesota courts was necessitated by the fact that Indiana's guest statute barred recovery. 444 
U.S. at 322. 
" See the discussion in Martin, 78 MICHL. REv. at 874-76. However, choice-of-law clauses 
in a contract have been held to establish "minimum contacts" with the selected state for long-
arm jurisdiction purposes. E.g., O'Hare Internat'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
77 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,§ 188 (1971) (rights and duties in 
contract action determined by law of state with the "most significant relationship to the trans-
action and the parties"). 
In Choate, Hall & Stewart, 378 Mass. at 540, 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1048, the Supreme Judicial 
Court strongly indicated it was prepared to change the Massachusetts choice-of-law rule, 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/12
§ 9.2 CIVIL PRACfiCE AND PROCEDURE 343 
Massachusetts forum non conveniens decisions support this position, 71 and 
it also finds support in the Supreme Court's view that the "minimum con-
tacts" test should take into consideration the "interstate judicial system's 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies. " 79 While 
the Supreme Judicial Court did not address this approach to the jurisdic-
tional problem in the Carlson opinion because neither the choice of law nor 
the forum non conveniens issues were presented by the appeal,· it is open on 
remand to the trial court and in future cases. 10 
§ 9.2. New Trials-Constitudonality of Additur. Rule S9(a) of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure contains a proviso that "[a] new 
trial shall not be granted solely on the ground that the damages are inade-
quate until the defendant has first been given an opportunity to accept an 
addition to the verdict of such amount as the court adjudges reasonable.'" 
In Freeman v. Wood, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of this "addition to the verdict" -called additur-over the plain-
tiff's objection that additur violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by 
Article 15 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 3 The decision puts to 
rest the "possibility" adverted to in the Reporters' Notes to Rule 59 that ad-
ditur violates Article 15,4 even though additur and its counterpart, remit-
noting the "awkward or arbitrary results" under the traditional place of making the contract 
rule where "that place had no or little other connection with the contract or the parties." 
Massachusetts law was applied in Choate, Hall & Stewart because the contract was executed in 
Massachusetts and, in addition, both parties were Massachusetts businesses and the contract 
was negotiated in Massachusetts. /d. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1049. The additional factors are 
missing in Carlson. 
1
' Universal Adjustment Corporation, 281 Mass. at 318-19, 184 N.E. at 160. Massachusetts 
courts will take judicial notice of foreign law. G.L. c. 233, § 70. See W. LEACH & P. LIACOS, 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE 25 (5th ed. 1981). 
" World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 666 n.10, 667, 402 N.E.2d at 487 n.lO. 
§ 9.2. ' MASS. R. C1v. P. 59(a); 365 Mass. 827 (1974). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 405, 401 N.E.2d 108. MASs. R. C1v. P. 59(a) extends additur and 
remittitur to nonjury trials, but this discussion will be limited to jury trials because only cases 
tried to a jury present the constitutional issue. See Bartley v. Phillips, 317 Mass. 35, 40, 57 
N.E.2d 26, 29 (1944) ("The law has been developed for the most part in jury cases, ... [b]ut 
the question is the same in actions tried without jury .... "). 
' Article 15 provides: 
In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, 
except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherwise used and practised, the parties 
shall have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held 
sacred .... 
• The Reporters' Notes are reprinted in J. Smith & H. Zobel, Rules Practice, 8 
MASSACHUSETIS PRACfiCE SERIES 436 (1977) and in 7 E. Swartz, F. Swartz, & W. Schwartz, 
MASSACHUSETIS PLEADING AND PRACfJCE 59-4 (1979). The case relied on by the Reporters, 
Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952), was overruled prior to the adoption of 
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 828, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 427 P.2d 988, 992 (1967). The Jehl case supports the result in Freeman v. 
15
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titur, have a long lineage in Massachusetts practice. 5 The decision also runs 
counter to a 1935 decision by the United States Supreme Court, Dimick v. 
Schiedt, 6 which held that additur violates the Seventh Amendment's jury 
trial guarantee but which reaffirmed, albeit reluctantly, the constitutionali-
ty of remittitur. 7 
Fundamental to the decision in Freeman is the Supreme Judicial Court's 
view that "short of impairment of the vital elements of the jury," Article 15 
interposes "no constitutional obstacle" to modification of jury 
procedures. 8 The opinion succinctly reviews the history of the judge's power 
to grant new trials where the damages awarded were excessive or inade-
quate, a power which was the foundation for the development of remittitur 
and additur as alternatives to a new trial. 9 Remittitur, the Court notes, has 
Wood, as Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution is similar to Article 15. See also 
CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE § 662.5 (Deering 1973). 
' The remittitur proviso to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59(a) states: 
A new trial shall not be granted solely on the ground that the damages are excessive until 
the prevailing party has first been given an opportunity to remit so much thereof as the 
court adjudges is excessive. 
Additur, thus, permits an addition to an inadequate verdict while remittitur allows the reduc-
tion of an excessive verdict. For a further description of remittitur, see the text beginning at 
note 22 infra . 
• 293 u.s. 474 (1935). 
' /d. at 486. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution applies only to the 
federal courts. Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877); Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. 
v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Baacsh, 
644 F.2d 94, 97 (2d. Cir. 1981). Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court was free to 
disregard the holding in Dimick v. Schiedt. In criminal cases, however, the Supreme Court has 
held that the fourteenth amendment compels the states to provide a jury trial in circumstances 
where the sixth amendment requires a jury trial in the f~deral courts. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 (1968). Seefurthernote 8 infra. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 407.{)8, 401 N.E.2d at 110. See also id. at 407, 401 N.E.2d at 109 
(Art. 15 "designed to ensure the continuance of the essentials of the civil jury"), id. at 409, 401 
N .E.2d at 110 ("what matters is whether [additur] strikes at the fundamentals of the jury"), id. 
at 410, 401 N.E.2d at 111 (additur is not "too violent an incursion by judges on the operations 
of juries"), and cases cited in id. at 407 n.6, 401 N.E.2d at 109 n.6. 
The Court's view of Article 15 means, of course, that further modifications of the jury in 
civil cases are possible, including the adoption of non unanimous verdicts. See id. at 408· & n. 7, 
401 N.E.2d at 110 &n.7. ln Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Supreme Court held 
that the federal Constitution does not compel a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials. 
A state may not, however, reduce the jury to fewer than six members, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 
U.S. 223 (1978), or sustain a conviction for a nonpetty offense on the basis of a nonunanimous 
verdict returned by asix~member jury. B'!l'ch v. Louisiana, 441,U.S. 130 (1979). Article 12 (not 
Article 15) of the Mas&aehusetts Declaration of Rights secures the right to a jury trial in 
crimifi81 cases. · 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at-408-10, 401 N.E.2d at 110-11. The Court said, however, that the 
"historicity of additur is [not] of any transcendent importance." /d. at 409,401 N.E.2d at 110. 
CJ. Burch v. Louisi.Da,. 441 U.S. a:t 137. 
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been widely accepted and its constitutionality upheld. 10 Additur must also 
be constitutional, the Court concludes, because there is "no relevant 
analytic difference" between remittitur and additur. 11 The opinion also 
notes that additur, as well as remittitur, has been "regularly recommended 
by students of civil procedure," 12 and that acceptance of one without the 
other would "create unfairness as well as anomaly." 13 Finally, the opinion 
suggests that the Supreme Court would decide Dimick differently today14 
and that, in any event, the Seventh Amendment's "reexamination clause" 
may require a more stringent federal rule than is compelled by Article 15, 
which has no reexamination clause; 5 
Three problems inherent in Rule 59(a)'s additur procedure are not re-
solved by Freeman. The principal problem is that inadequate damages may 
indicate the jury impermissibly returned a compromise verdict. 16 Freeman 
alludes to the possibility of a compromise jury verdict in its concluding 
paragraph, where it states that "[a]n unduly slim verdict ... may signal the 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 411, 401 N.E.2d at 111. 
" Id. Other commentators have agreed. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Damages 
(1935-1947), 61 HARv. L. REv. 113, 114 & n.13 (1947); Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 
W.VA. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1942). 
12 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410, 401 N.E.2d at 111. Mr. Justice Kaplan, the author of the 
opinion, is himself a recognized authority on civil procedure. See, e.g., R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1973); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(/), 81 HARv. L. REv. 3S6 (1967). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 411, 401 N.E.2d at 111. The Court explained that otherwise "a 
plaintiff would have an absolute right to a new trial in the face of an inadequate jury award, 
but a defendant in case of an excessive award must submit to a lesser sum set by the judge and 
agreed by the plaintiff." /d. at 411, 401 N.E.2d at 111-12. 
,. /d. at 413, 401 N.E.2d at 112. "One sign" the Freeman opinion says, of a likely shift in 
the Supreme Court's position on the constitutionality of additur is that the Supreme Court 
formerly held that allowing federal judges to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
violated the seventh amendment, Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 
(1913), and later qualified that position in Baltimore & Carolina Line v:. Redman, 29S U.S. 6S4 
(l93S). Note, however, that the latter case was decided the same year as Dimick v. Schiedt. The 
Freeman opinion follows closely the reasoning of Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion to the 
S to 4 decision in Dimick v. Schiedt. 
" 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. at411-13, 401 N.E.2dat 112-13. Theseventhamendmenttothe U.S. 
Constitution provides: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law. (emphasis added). 
The text of Article IS is reproduced at note 3 supra. 
" Cf. Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. S63, S70, 97 N.E. 102,10S (1912). it seems equally clear 
that inadequate damages could indicate jury bias against the plaintiff, even where there is no 
compromise on the issue of the defendant's liability. See Clark v. Henshaw Motor Company, 
246 Mass. 386, 140 N.E. S93 (1923). Excessive damages, on the other hand, may signal bias or 
17
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existence of other defects in the work of the jury" which would preclude a 
determination that the "verdict is sound except for inadequacy" of 
damages. 17 "In such a case," the Court warns, "additur would not be ap-
propriate, and a simple new trial would be called for." 11 The concerns sub-
sumed in the opinion's glancing references to "slim" verdicts and the rela-
tionship of the additur to new trials are illurnJ.nated by a brief examination 
of the development of remittitur and additur in Massachusetts practice. 
Remittitur's development will be described first because it is both older 
and more widely accepted than additur. 19 Under the pre-rules practice, the 
losing party could move for a new trial on the ground that the damages 
awarded by the jury were excessive, and, if the judge agreed, the judge 
could order a new trial on the issues of both liability and damages.20 Massa-
chusetts practice also permitted the judge to limit the new trial to the issue 
of damages. 21 The advantages of limiting the new trial to damages alone 
were that it preserved the jury's liability decision for the prevailing party, 
curtailed the expense incident to a new trial, and made more efficient use of 
judicial resources. 
Remittitur emerged as an alternative to the new trial as a means for deal-
ing with excessive jury verdicts. 22 The trial judge, acting on the defendant's 
motion, would determine that the jury's damages award was excessive and 
by how much. The judge would then conditionally order a new trial23 and 
prejudice against the defendant. E.g., Sampson v. Smith, 15 Mass. 365, 367 (1819) Gurors had 
"their passions excited on questions of personal liberty and right"). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 413, 401 N.E.2d at 113. 
" /d. at 414, 401 N.E.2d at 113. 
" Cf. id. at408, 401 N.E.2d at 110. See generally F. JAMEs&G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(2d ed. 1977) § 7.21 at 321-24, 332; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. at 482. In Massachusetts, 
remittitur was codified at least as early as 1897, while additur was not codified until1945. See 
notes 22 and 24 infra. 
•• Sampson v. Smith, 15 Mass. 365 (1819); Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 26 Mass. 10 (1829); 
Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. 379, 385 (1825); Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 41-42 (1808). 
" Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass. 606,609, 94 N.E. 46 (1911)(upholding constitutionali-
ty of proposed statute-subsequently enacted 'as Acts of 1911, c. SOl-limiting to damages 
issue any new trial ordered because of excessive or inadequate damages. In Simmons v. Fish, 
210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912), the Court asserted that limiting the new trial to issues, in-
cluding damages, which were "separable" from the general verdict was a matter of "inherent 
judicial authority" and did not depend on a statute. /d. at 568, 97 N.E. at 104. This rule, the 
Court recognized, was a modification of "[t]he ancient common law doctrine that a verdict of 
a jury was single and indivisible and must stand or fall as a whole." /d. at 565, 97 N.E. at 103. 
Accord, Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931) ("where 
the requirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one issue of 
fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue even though another and 
separable issue must be tried again"). 
" Acts of 1897, c. 472, § 2, appears to be the first Massachusetts remittitur statute. It stated 
that "No verdict shall be set aside as excessive unless the prevailing party is first given an op-
portunity to remit so much.of said verdict as the court shall adjudge to be excessive." 
" Termed a "new trial nisi" in Freeman, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410, 401 N.E.2d at 111. 
See also Nicklass v. City of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 471, 473-74, 146 N.E. 41, 42 (1925). 
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give the plaintiff an opportunity to remit the excessive portion. If the plain-
tiff consented to the remittitur, judgment was simply entered for the plain-
tiff on the reduced verdict. If the plaintiff did not consent to the remittitur, 
the defendant was given a new trial on either liability and damages or on 
damages alone, at the judge's discretion. 24 This procedure is now embodied 
in Rule 59( a). 2 ' 
Additur received a more.reluctant acceptance in Massachusetts practice 
than its counterpart, remittitur. 26 Unlike some other jurisdictions, however, 
Massachusetts did recognize at an early date that new trials could be granted 
to remedy inadequate as well as excessive jury verdicts. 27 More than sixty 
years before Freeman, the Supreme Judicial Court declared in Simmons v. 
•• This was the rule prior to the Acts of 1911, c. SOl,§ 1, which amended Rev. Laws. c. 173, 
§ 112, the 1901 successor to the first remittitur statute. The 1911 amendment, which purported 
to curtail" such judicial discretion, provided that if the "sole ground" for granting the new trial 
was either the inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages awarded, the new trial "shall be 
limited to the question of the amount of damages." (emphasis added). This statutory limita-
tion on the scope of the new trial conflicted with the decision in Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 
S63, 97 N.E. 102 (1912), which was decided shortly after chapter SOl was enacted. There the 
Court enunciated the common law discretion of the judge to order either a full or a limited 
retrial where damages were inadequate. 
Th.is divergence between the common law and statutory approaches was not reconciled until 
194S when G.L. c. 231, § 127 (1932) (which had repeated the 1911 provisions) was amended by 
the Acts of 194S, c. S78, § 2, to reflect the holding in Simmons v. Fish. The 194S amendment 
provided for full or limited retrial in cases of inadequate verdicts, but it continued to limit the 
new trial to damages where the verdict was excessive. See Twentieth Report of the Judicial 
Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 (Dec. 1944), reprinted in 29 MASS. L. Q. (No.4) 9, at 2S-27 (Dec. 
1944). 
The 194S amendment was the model for the additur proviso in MASS. R. C1v. P. S9(a). See 
Acts of 197S, c. 377, § 109, repealing G.L. c. 231, § 127, which was superseded by Rule 59(a). 
See also Freeman, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 406 & n.4, 401 N.E.2d at 109 & n.4; D'Annolfo v. 
Stoneham Housing Auth., 375 Mass. 650, 661, 378 N.E.2d 971, 979 (1978). 
" See note 5 supra. 
" Though one leading treatise states that "no known Massachusetts decision deals with the 
additur,'' J. Smith & H. Zobel, supra note 4, § 59.4 at 445, there does appear to be case law on 
the subject. See, e.g., Clark v. Henshaw Motor Company, 246 Mass. 386, 140 N.E. 593 (1923), 
in which the Court increased the damages awarded the plaintiff to reflect the minimum amount 
the jury had been instructed to award on a finding of breach of contract.The addition was held 
proper, against the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, because the defendant had filed a stipula-
tion that judgment might be so entered. !d., at 389, 140 N.E. 594. An earlier case, Shanahan v. 
Boston & Northern Street Railway Co., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N.E. 751 (1907), had adopted the 
English rule that both plaintiff and defendant had to consent to the amount of additur, a re-
quirement which was later embodied in the first Massachusetts additur statute, Acts of 1945, c. 
578, § 1. The requirement of plaintiff's consent was later dropped, probably properly; the rule 
had been made in a case where the damages were not only "inadequate," but the liability deci-
sion had been adverse to the plaintiff as well. Shanahan, 193 Mass. at 413, 414, 79 N.E. at 751, 
752. The principle that seems to have been espoused by the courts prior to the additur statute 
was the judges did not have discretion to "add" to a verdict, but could "amend" it in cases of 
clear jury error. Minot v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 10, 86 N.E. 783 (1909). 
" See Freeman, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 408-09, 401 N.E.2d at 110; Simmons v. Fish, 210 
Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912); Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 26 Mass. 10 (1829). 
19
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Fish, that there is "[n]o sound distinction ... between a verdict in which ex-
cessive damages have been returned and one in which inadequate damages 
have been awarded. " 28 In that case the Court held that the trial judge had 
"inherent judicial authority" either to grant a new trial or a new trial 
limited to damages in both situations. 29 Nevertheless, concern over com-
promise jury verdicts caused divergence in practice (although not in theory) 
between the handling of excessive and of inadequate verdicts. 
The divergence in practice stems from the statement in Simmons that in 
cases of inadequate damages a new trial limited to that issue is appropriate 
only in the ''exceptional and extremely rare instances that the inadequacy of 
damages will not be so interwoven with liability that justice can be done 
without a new trial upon the whole case. " 30 Earlier decisions had indicated 
that appropriate instances were likely to arise in contract cases or in other 
circumstances where the damages could be ascertained with some con-
fidence.31 In tort cases, however, the question of damages was clouded by 
the possibility of a compromise verdict. 
The problem in tort cases is illustrated by Simmons itself, where a nine 
year old boy sued for the loss of his eye. The defendant disputed respon-
sibility for the injury, but not the extent of the resulting harm to the plain-
tiff. The jury returned a plaintiff's verdict for $200. On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court found it "inconceivable that any jury, having 
agreed upon the issue of liability, should have reached such a determination 
as to damages. " 32 The Court reasoned, in effect, that either the defendant 
was not negligent, and owed the plaintiff nothing; or was negligent, and the 
damages were inadequate. Consequently, the jury's verdict reflected an im-
permissible compromise between the liability and damages components of 
the case. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial, but 
that it would be unjust to limit the new trial to damages because the newly 
empanelled jury could only increase the plaintiff's recovery. If the new jury 
were precluded from reexamining whether the defendant's conduct had 
caused the injury, it could not cure the compromise in the first jury's ver-
dict. 33 Neither Freeman nor Rule 59( a) relieve the trial judge of the difficult 
11 210 Mass. at 569, 97 N.E. at 105. 
" /d. at 568, 97 N.E. at 104. See also note 24 supra. 
•• 210 Mass. at 570, 97 N.E. at 105. 
" E.g., Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 26 Mass. at 11 (1829). Generally speaking, both additur 
and remittitur are more easily applied in cases where damages are either liquidated or readily 
calculable by applying legal rules to the facts. Personal injury claims, like Freeman v. Wood, 
! present difficult occasions for using additur or remittitur because of the greater discretion the 
jury has in fiXing the amount of damages. See generally, F. JAMES.& G. HAZARD, supra note 
19, § 7.21 at 321-22. Compare MASS. R. C1v. P. 55(b)(l) and (2)(clerk may enter judgment on 
default for "sum certain" or "sum which can by computation be made certain"; otherwise 
court must assess damages). 
" Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. at 571-72, 9'fN.B. at 106. 
"/d. 
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task of identifying cases like Simmons where the use of additur is inap-
propriate because the jury's liability decision is tainted by compromise. 
The comparative negligence statute poses the second problem in using ad-
ditur in tort actions where the jury's damages award seems inadequate. The 
difficulty stems from the statute's requirement that "any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable 
to the person for whose injury recovery is made. " 34 This requirement inex-
tricably links the damages award to the relative degree of culpability found 
by the jury, thereby compounding the difficult task of ascertaining the basis 
for the jury's low damages award. The Supreme Judicial Court did not con-
front this problem in Freeman, 35 however, because the trial judge ordered 
the additur after the jury returned a special verdict. 36 Use of a special ver-
dict removes the impediment posed by the comparative negligence statute to 
the trial judge's power under Rule 59( a) to determine whether the damages 
awarded by the jury are inadequate because the jury must tell the judge how 
much negligence it attributed to the plaintiff and the resulting reduction it 
made in the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 37 
A third recurring problem with the use of additur is the determination of 
the appropriate sum to add to the jury's verdict. This issue was not 
presented for decision in Freeman because the plaintiff addressed his objec-
tion to the trial judge's refusal to grant his motion for a new trial, not to the 
amount of the additur proposed by the judge and accepted by the defend-
ant. 31 However, a recent decision involving the use of remittitur, D'Annoljo 
v. Stoneham Housing Authority, 39 made clear that the "constitutional right 
•• G.L. c. 231, § 8S para. 1 (West Supp. 1981). 
" In Freeman, the jury returned a special verdict that the defendant was "wholly responsi-
ble" for the accident, so the Court did not have to address the relationship between additur 
and the comparative negligence statute. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 406, 401 N.E.2d at 109. 
" MASS. R. Crv. P. 49(a). Alternately, the court could use a general verdict accompanied by 
answer to interrogatories under MASS. R. Crv. P. 49(b). See note 37 infra. 
" To illustrate the problem further, hypothesize the steps followed by the jury in returning a 
general verdict under the comparative negligence statute. The jury should decide (I) whether 
the defendant is legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury, (2) the appropriate amount of 
compensation for the injury, (3) whether the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the injury, 
and (4) the percentage of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. For example, general verdicts 
for $90,000 (if the jJUY funds IOOJo contributory negligence) and $60,000 (for 400Jo contributory 
negligence) are exact equivalents. Both verdicts are sound if the trial judge concurs in the jury's 
initial assessment that $100,000 is adequate compensation for the plaintiff's injury (assuming, 
of coJJrse, there are sufficient facts before the jury to support a range of cOnclusions on the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence). The problem arises because under a general verdict the 
trial judge does not know how the jury applied the comparative negligence statute to arrive at 
its damages award. If, for example, the jury returned a $60,000 verdict but found the plaintiff 
did not contribute to her injury (OOJo contributory negligence), the damages are inadequate and 
additur (or a new trial) is called for. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 406, 401 N.E.2d at 109. 
" 31S Mass. 6SO, 378 N.E.2d 971 (1978). 
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to a jury determination of damages" does limit the judge's discre-
tion-remittitur cannot be used to "substitute [the court's] judgment in the 
ultimate determination of damages. " 40 The Court nevertheless rejected 
D' Annolfo's argument that the remittitur could be used only to reduce the 
verdict to the ''highest amount that the jury could properly have awarded,'' 
stating that Rule S9(a) gives the judge discretion to set the damages 
"anywhere within the range of verdicts supported by the evidence."41 
D'Annolfo represents a controversial approach. One leading commen-
tary terms this approach a "clear invasion of the jury's sphere" because it 
allows the trial judge not just to trim an excessive verdict down to the 
highest amount the jury could legally award, but also to pressure the 
prevailing party into accepting a still smaller sum.42 Accordingly, this com-
mentary would permit judges to use additur only to raise the verdict to the 
minimum damages award legally consistent with the jury's liability deci-
sion.43 
Dictum in Freeman, however, rejects this limitation on the trial judge's 
discretion under Rule S9(a). The opinion states that the trial judge may pro-
pose as an additur a figure "within" the "range of a just verdict. " 44 
Freeman is, accordingly, subject to the same criticism as D'Annolfo with 
respect to the possible invasion of the jury's function. One consequence 
which flows from the adoption of such a discretionary rule is that it 
becomes harder for an appellate court45 to preserve the constitutional right 
•• /d. at 662,378 N.E.2d at 979. See also Freeman, 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. at 413,401 N.E.2d 
at 113. (additur appropriate only when damages "descend to the level of unreasonableness"); 
Minot v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 10, 86 N.E. 783 (1909). 
•• 375 Mass. at 660, 662, 378 N.E.2d at 979. The Court particularly relied on the language in 
the remittitur proviso to MASS. R. C1v. P. 59( a) that the prevailing party may remit the portion 
of the verdict that the "court adjudges is excessive." /d. at 661, 378 N.E.2d at 979. 
"' F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, § 7.21 at 335. Other commentators question the 
validity of this inference. See, e.g., Scorr, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN AcnoNS AT LAW 
122-26 (1922). In D'Annoljo, 375 Mass. at 661, 378 N.E.2d at 979, the Court acknowledged 
that federal court practice may more narrowly circumscribe judge's power to fix the amount of 
the remittitur. 
•• F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, § 7.21 at 334-35. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410 & n.10, 401 N.E.2d at 111 & n.10. The additur is for "such 
amount as the court adjudges reasonable." See note 41 supra. See also Raunela v. Hertz 
Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 280 N.E.2d 179 (1972) on the permissible range of damages ad-
justments. 
•• Freeman expressly eschews any discussion of appellate rights, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410 
n.11, 401 N.E.2d at 111 n.11, but it does state that the trial judge's "traditional discretion" to 
decide whether a verdict should stand despite the contention it is inadequate or excessive would 
"generally be respected by an appellate court, at least where damages were unliquidated." /d. 
at 409 n.9, 401 N:E.2d at 111 n.9. The federal courts do not permit appellate review of a remit-
titur which has been accepted under protest. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., Inc., 429 U.S. 
648 (1977). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1327 (1967). 
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to a jury determination of damages. 46 Thus, the trial judge may pressure the 
defendant to pay more than the minimum damages award the jury might 
properly have awarded. 
§ 9.3. Preliminary Injunctions-Standards. In Packaging Industries 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court, drawing on an article 
by Professor Leubsdorf, 1 defined the standards for issuing a preliminary in-
junction for the first time since the merger of law and equity under the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The opinion would be important, 
if for no other reason, because Massachusetts appellate decisions on 
preliminary injunctions are rare. The significant aspect of the decision, 
however, is the three-stage balancing test 4 adopted by the Court to deter-
mine whether issuance of a preliminary judgment is warranted. 
The rules of civil procedure themselves do not define the standards for is-
suing preliminary injunctions.' Rather, the standards are drawn from prin-
" But see D'Annolfo v. Stoneham Housing Auth., 375 Mass. at 662, 378 N.E.2d at 979, 
where the Court observed that the prevailing party may simply reject the judge's proposed 
remittitur and thereby secure another jury trial. This may not be an adequate safeguard for the 
constitutional right to trial by jury because the plaintiff, in deciding whether to accept or reject 
the judge's "offer," must bear in mind the possibility that the second jury will return an 
adverse liability finding or, perhaps more likely, a damages award less than the reduction pro-
posed by the judge but still within the acceptable range of verdicts so that it cannot be attacked 
for inadequacy. Even if the plaintiff is confident the second jury will sustain the plaintiff's 
view of a proper verdict, the plaintiff must still discount the verdict by the cost of securing it at 
the new trial. C/. Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv. 67, 70 (1969). 
A per curiam decision by the Appeals Court during the Survey year, Silkey v. N. Eng. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 31, 398 N.E.2d 508, also affected the ability to obtain a 
jury determination of damages. In Silkey, the court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to have 
damages assessed by a jury after the defendant defaulted. The court noted that MASs. R. C1v. 
P. 55(b)(2) provides for trial by jury under these circumstances "when and as required by 
statute" and that the only statute, G.L. c. 231, § 57, was repealed in 1974. The question 
whether this practice violated Article 15 was not addressed. The result is anomalous because 
the statute was repealed as part of the legislation implementing the new rules of civil procedure 
and it is unlikely the Legislature intended to alter the preexisting right to a jury. See Acts of 
1973, c. 1114, § 171; Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 87. See also Greenberg v. Greenberg, 1980 Mass. 
App. Adv. Sh. 335, 406 N.E.2d 731 Gury right lost by failure to file timely demand, per MASs. 
R. C1v. P. 38(b) and (d); time cannot be enlarged by agreement of the parties without the 
court's consent, per MAss. R. C1v. P. 6(b)(3)). 
§ 9.3 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 405 N.E.2d 106. The case was before the Court on an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118, para. 2, added by Acts of 1977, c. 405. 
' Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 525 (1978). 
' MASs. R. C1v. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure ... in all suits of a civil nature 
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.'') But see 
Taunton Greyhound Ass'n Inc. v. Town of Dighton, 373 Mass. 60, 62 n.3, 364 N.E.2d 1234, 
1236 n.3 (1977). 
• The opinion, although establishing such a· test, does not employ this description of it. 
' See MASs. R. C1v. P. 65(b). But see MASS. R. C1v. P. 65(a) (for temporary restraining 
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ciples of equity jurisprudence that predate the rules. 6 There is greater uncer-
tainty, however, in these principles and in their application to particular 
cases than one would suppose. 7 The basic problem, as Professor Leubsdorf 
has stated, is that the preliminary injunction presents the "dilemma of in-
terlocutory inaccuracy."• The Court in Packaging Industries agreed with 
this assessment, stating that the preliminary injunction decision is, "by 
definition," made on the basis of an "abbreviated presentation of the facts 
and laws. " 9 Because abbreviated presentation and the concomitant risk of 
error call for restraint, the Court concluded that a preliminary injunction 
should issue only if the plaintiff demonstrates it would suffer a "loss of 
rights that cannot be vindicated" at a subsequent trial on the merits. 10 
These considerations are taken into account in the usual formulation that 
a plaintiff must demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and 
irreparable injury to obtain a preliminary injunction. On the other hand, as 
the Court observed in Packaging Industries, the "enjoined party may then 
suffer the same type of irreparable harm" pendente lite if it prevails at the 
trial on the merits and the preliminary injunction is, perforce, dissolved. 11 
Accordingly, the Court stated, 
[s]ince the judge's assessment of the parties' lawful rights at the 
preliminary stage of the proceedings may not correspond to the final 
judgment, the judge should seek to minimize the ''harm that final 
relief cannot redress" by creating or preserving, in so far as possible, a 
state of affairs such that after the full trial, a meaningful decision may 
be rendered for either party. 12 
While there is nothing novel in the Court's renewed emphasis on the defend-
ant's stake in the outcome of a preliminary injunction hearing, 13 the Court's 
suggested approach to reconciling the competing interests is distinctive, at 
least in the Massachusetts cases. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Packaging Industries creates a three-stage 
test to use in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. At the first 
order, must show "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the appli-
cant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition"). 
' See J. Smith & H. Zobel, Rules Practice, SA MASSACHUSE'ITS PRAcriCE SERIES§ 65.1 
(1981). 
' Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 525. See Wellington, Preliminary Injunctions in the Second 
Circuit, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 831 (1977). 
• Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 541. See also id. at 545 (''tension between speedy decision and 
correct decision that lies at the core of prelimin8ry injunction analysis''), 549, 557, 565. 
' Packllging Industries, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1196, 405 N.E.2d at 111. 
11 /d. Accord, Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(''primary.J~fication" for-preliminary injunction is to "preserve the court's ability to render 
a meaniqful decision on the merits"). The Packaging Industries Court did not address the 
possible effect of the requirement in MASS. R. CIV. P. 6S(c) that the preliminary injunction be 
conditioned on the postiq of security. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1196, 405 N.E.2d at 111. 
u /d. (citation omitted) (quoting Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 541). 
11 'E. •• ; DrMO/HMIIts In tM Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1056 (1965). 24
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stage of the preliminary injunction inquiry, the judge is instructed to ex-
amine the plaintiff's "claim of injury and chance of success on the 
merits. " 14 These two factors must be evaluated "in combination" to deter-
mine the "risk of [irreparable] harm in light of the party's chance of success 
on the merits." 1' If the judge concludes that there is a "substantial risk of 
irreparable harm" when the case is evaluated from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, he must move on to the second stage of the preliminary injunction in-
quiry. 16 The second stage requires the judge to evaluate the same factors on 
the defendant's side of the case. At the third stage, the judge must 
"balance" the risks to both parties. A preliminary injunction should issue 
only if the balance tips in the plaintiff's favor. 17 
The Court's restatement of the purpose of a preliminary injunction and 
its focus on balancing the parties' competing interests is helpful. Less cer-
tain, however, is the weight to be ascribed to the two principal factors in the 
equation, the likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of ir-
reparable injury. Professor Leubsdorf's model gives equal weight to both 
factors, 18 and Packaging Industries appears to follow his lead. In dicta, the 
opinion states that it is appropriate to deny a preliminary injunction where 
the plaintiff is more likely than the defendant to prevail on the merits of the 
legal claim but the defendant will suffer greater injury, pendente lite, than 
the plaintiff. 19 This statement is addressed to the third stage of the analysis 
and is quite appropriate. At another point in the opinion the Court makes it 
clear that both factors do at least have to be present at the first stage of the 
analysis. 20 Absent a showing of irreparable injury, the Court states, a 
preliminary injunction must be denied, ''no matter how likely it may be that 
the moving party will prevail on the merits. " 21 
A difficult question which arises at the first stage of the Packaging In-
14 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1197,405 N.E.2d at 111-12. 
" /d. at 1197, 405 N.E.2d at 112. 
16 /d. 
" /d. The opinion does not explicitly adopt Professor Leubsdorf's formulation but the 
parallels are at least sufficiently striking to warrant quoting his formulation of the standards 
for preliminary injunction decisions: 
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights an injunction 
would cause by multiplying the probability that the defendant will prevail by the 
amount of the irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if enjoined from exercis-
ing what turns out to be his legal right. It should then make a similar calculation of the 
probable irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction. 
Whichever course promises the smaller probable loss should be adopted. 
Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 542. Leubsdorf uses percentages to illustrate the operation of his 
model, id. at 54344, and compares it to other formulations, id. at 544-48. 
" See note 17 supra. But see Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. F.P.C., 259 F.2d 921,925 
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ("But [irreparable} injury ~ld insufficient to justify a stay in one case may 
well be sufficient to justify it in another, where the applicant has demonstrated a higher proba-
bility of success in the merits."). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1202, 405 N.E.2d at 114. 
•• /d. at 1201, 405 N.E.2d at 114; see also id. at ll97, 405 N.E.2d at 112. 
21 /d. at 1201, 405 N.E.2d at 114. 25
Bowman: Chapter 9: Civil Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
354 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 9.3 
dustries' analysis is whether a certainty that the plaintiff will suffer severe 
irreparable injury can substitute for a virtual certainty that the plaintiff will 
not prevail on the merits. Under these circumstances, would a preliminary 
injunction be justified in a case where the defendant would suffer only 
minimal injury until the trial on the merits? The anwer should be "no."22 
Here the "dilemma of interlocutory inaccuracy" 23 is dissipated by the lack 
of merit in the plaintiff's legal claim. Stated differently, absent a claim for 
relief recognized by the law, the plaintiff's injury, however great, must go 
unrectified. 24 This view is consistent with prior case law in Massachusetts. 25 
Accord Canal Auth. of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 {5th Cir. 1974). Contra 
Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247,250 {2d Cir. 1973) {preliminary 
injunction also available upon showing of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to 
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the 
[applicant]' 1). 
The Packaging Industries opinion accords with the conclusion in the text, 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1197 n.l2, 405 N.E.2d at 112 n.l2, but simultaneously casts doubt on it in two ways. 
First, it appears that the Court felt the plaintiff in Packaging Industries had not demonstrated 
a likelihood of success on the merits, but the opinion regularly refers to the lack of irreparable 
injury as the basis for affirming the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction. !d. at 
1197-202, 405 N.E.2d at 112-14. Second, one of the few secondary sources cited by the opin-
ion, id. at 1197, 405 N.E.2d at 112, supports the proposition that a showing of likelihood of 
success may be dispensed with. Note, Probability of Ultimate Success Held Unnecessary for 
Grant of Interlocutory Injunction, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 165 {1971) (discussion of Semmes 
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
" Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 541. 
•• Such an across-the-board proposition may have to be qualified in some cases. A 
preliminary injunction might be appropriate, for example, where the plaintiff's cause of action 
is recognized by the law, but the plaintiff's factual showing at the preliminary injunction hear-
ing is so slight that it appears unlikely the plaintiff will prevail at the trial on the merits. Here 
the balance of injury to the two parties might be decisive, especially if the case is one where the 
facts are in the defendant's control but the plaintiff will gain access to them through discovery. 
(The plaintiff's failure to garner sufficient facts promptly through discovery might be grounds 
for later dissolution of the preliminary injunction pendente lite.) The public interest in the 
preliminary injunction combined with the difficulty of determining whether the plaintiff has a 
cause of action poses another possible qualification to the principle set forth in the text. Con-
sider, for example, a suit to stop the defendant from disposing of toxic materials in interstate 
waters. The defendant's violation of a statutory duty as well as the resulting widespread injury 
may be clear, but under the Supreme Court's recent decisions rejecting implied rights of action 
it may not be clear whether the plaintiff can sue to enforce the duty. Here a preliminary injunc-
tion might be justified until the issue can be fully briefed and argued on a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6). See U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290, 293 {1947) {court 
may restrain a labor strike pending decision whether it has jurisdiction under Norris-
LaGuardia Act, unless assertion of jurisdiction is "frivolous and not substantial"). Compare 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied private right of action for sex 
discrimination) with cases rejecting claims based on an implied right of action theory, e.g., 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 {1981) (water pollution), Middlesex Co. Sewerage 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 {1981) (same), Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 {1979) {securities law). 
" E.g., Taunton Greyhound Association, Inc. v. Town of Dighton, 373 Mass. 60, 62 n.3, 
26
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Several other facets of the Packaging Industries opinion merit brief com-
ment. First, unlike other courts and commentators, 26 the Supreme Judicial 
Court did not include the public interest among the factors in its balancing 
test. This omission is not necessarily telling because the Packaging In-
dustries litigation did not affect the public interest. However, the public in-
terest is frequently affected when a preliminary injunction is sought against 
a government official .or agency because the effects of the injunction often 
radiate beyond the immediate parties to the lawsuit and generally interfere 
with the enforcement of statutes or regulations. The public interest may also 
be a factor which should be weighed in the balance where the government or 
a private party seeks to enforce a statute or regulation or where a statute 
specifically authorizes interlocutory relief. 27 In addition, public policy may 
dictate that personal constitutional rights be protected pendente lite even 
absent specific evidence of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. 21 In an ap-
propriate case, therefore, the Court should include the public interest as 
part of its balancing test. 29 
The Court also noted in Packaging Industries that a preliminary injunc-
tion is not warranted "if trial on the merits can be conducted before the in-
jury occurs." 3° Consolidation of the trial on the merits with the preliminary 
injunction hearing pursuant to MAss. R. Civ. P. 6S(b)(2) is one avenue to 
this end. The Court stated, however, that a party's request for consolida-
tion made at the time of the hearing is not timely because the opposing party 
is entitled to " 'clear and unambiguous notice' " of consolidation so that it 
has " 'a full opportunity' to present its case." 31 Although Packaging In-
364 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 n.3 (1977) ("reasonable prospect of success on merits" is a requisite to 
preliminary injunction); Gallison v. Downing, 244 Mass. 33, 38, 138 N.E. 315, 318 (1923) 
("prima facie appearance of ground to support the contentions of the plaintiff"). 
26 E.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 2948 at 430-31, 
457-61 (1973); 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, , 65.04(1) at 65-45 (2d ed. 1979); Virginia 
Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. F.P.C., 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
" Note, however, the general principle that violations of penal statutes will not be enjoined. 
Mass. Society of Optometrists v. Waddick, 340 Mass, 581, 585-86, 165 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1960). 
See also Attorney General v. Kenco Optics, Inc., 369 Mass. 412, 415-16, 340 N.E.2d 868, 870 
(1976). For the effect on declaratory judgments, see Norcissa v. Selectmen of Provincetown, 
368 Mass. 161, 172-73, 330 N.E.2d 830, 836-37 (1975). See also Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. 
Dept. of Public Health, 372 Mass. 844, 845, 855, 364 N.E.2d 1202, 1204, 1209 (1977). 
" Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) ("loss of First Amendment freedoms ... un-
questionably constitutes irreparable injury"). Cf. Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 
70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). 
" Professor Leubsdorf cautions, however, that consideration of the public interest "does 
not mean the interest of everyone affected by the grant or denial of preliminary relief should 
figure in the interlocutory hearing," and that the court should determine the interests which 
should be taken into account "by reference to the substantive law that will apply when the case 
goes to trial." Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 549. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1197 n.ll, 405 N.E.2d at 112 n.ll. 
" /d. at 1197 n.lO, 405 N.E.2d at Ill n.lO. Cf Wohlfahrt v. Memorial Medical Center, 658 
27
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dustries did not address the issue, presumably the notice principle also limits 
the judge's discretion to order consolidation with the merits at the com-
mencement of the preliminary injunction hearing. 32 
Finally, the Court in Packaging Industries stated as one ground for af-
firming the denial of a preliminary injunction that money damages would 
adequately redress any harm the plaintiffs might suffer pendente lite 
because there was "no evidence that the defendant would be unable to pay 
any damages which the plaintiffs might be awarded.'' 33 The significance of 
this statement is that it evinces little interest in the traditional inadequate 
remedy at law test for permitting equity to displace legal remedies. 34 It does 
not, in other words, seek to determine whether a court, after a trial on the 
merits, will be capable of assessing money damages under the circumstances 
presented by the case before it or whether money damages can redress the 
plaintiff's injury. Instead, the question becomes whether the plaintiff will 
be able to collect the compensatory damages awarded at law. Although this 
approach is not unknown, 35 it is unusual, if the Court intends proof of the 
defendant's insolvency to establish irreparable injury for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction. 36 The Supreme Judicial Court should seek to clarify 
this point in a future decision. 
a party may appeal an interlocutory order by a superior court or housing 
§ 9.4. Preliminary Injunctions-Interlocutory Appeals. In addition to 
defining the standards for issuing preliminary injunctions, the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, confirmed 
the procedural incidents of an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary in-
junction decision.• Under the second paragraph of chapter 231, section 118, 
F.2d 416,418 (5th Cir. 1981) ("whether the consolidation is express or implied, however, suffi-
cient notice is required to permit the parties to develop their cases fully."). 
" Note, however, that MASS. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2) permits the court to order consolidation 
"before or after" commencement of the preliminary injunction hearing. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1201, 405 N.E.2d at 114. 
•• The test is equally applicable to the decision to grant permanent equitable relief. D. 
DoBBS, REMEDIES, § 2.10 at 108 (1973). The "hierarchy of remedies" which prefers law over 
equity has been criticized. 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCfiON 1, 6 (1978). See Curtis-
Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1531, 1539-41, 4JJ7 N.E.2d 
319, 326-27, on the relationship of damages and permanent injunctions in trade secrets litiga-
tion. 
" Developments Note, supra note 12, at 1002. See also American Cyanamid v. Ethicon 
Ltd., [1975) A.C. 396, 408 (H.L.). But cf. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 
415 U.S. 1, 24 ("Mere litigation expense~ even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not 
constitute irreparable injury."). 
'" See Newman, The JVfect of Insolvency on Equitable Relief. 13 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 44 
(1938) for a discussion in the context of permanent injunctions. 
§ 9.4. ' Packqina Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 405 
N.E.2d 106. The Appeals Court traversed this ground earlier fu Demoulas Super Markets, Inc. 
v. Peter's Market Basket, Inc., S Mass. App. Ct. 750, 370 N.E.2d 719 (1977). See generally 
28
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court judge "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving a 
preliminary injunction, or refusing to dissolve a preliminary injunction. " 2 
This statute, as amended in 1977, substantially conforms Massachusetts 
practice to the federal practice under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l)3 and is an ex-
ception to the "general policy disfavoring appeals from interlocutory 
orders." 4 
The distinguishing feature of the second paragraph of section 118, ac-
cording to Packaging Industries, is that it provides for an appeal as a matter 
of right to the full bench of the Appeals Court, and not discretionary review 
by a single justice.' The appeal, consequently, must be perfected in the same 
manner as an appeal from a final judgment6 and is not heard on an ex-
Henn, Civil Interlocutory Appeals in the Massachusetts State Courts, 62 MASs. L. Q. 225 
(1977). In regard to the standards for issuing preliminary injunctions, see § 9.3 supra. 
' G.L. c. 231, § 118 para. 2. The second paragraph was added to§ 118 by Acts of 1977, c. 
405. The amendment altered the prior Massachusetts practice, see Foreign Auto Import v. 
Renault Northeast, 367 Mass. 464, 468, 326 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1975), which did not provide 
for interlocutory appeals as a matter of right to the full bench of either the Appeals Court or 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1191, 405 N.E.2d at 108. See 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
,, 110.20-110.21 (1980); 16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
§§ 3921-24 (1977). Note, however, that MASS. R. Civ. P. 52(a), unlike FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 
does not require the trial court judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when 
granting or denying a preliminary injunction. Packaging Industries, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1191 n.6, 405 N.E.2d at 109 n.6. 
• CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v. Attorney General, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1117, 1118, 
404 N.E.2d 1219, 1221. See also Pollock v. Kelly, 372 Mass. 469, 470-72, 362 N.E.2d 525, 
527-28 (1977) (demurrer); Cappadona v. Riverside 400 Function Room, 372 Mass. 167, 169, 
360 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (1977) (stay); Nat'! Assn. of Government Employees, Inc. v. Central 
Broadcasting Corp., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2485, 2486 & n.2, 396 N.E.2d 996, 998 & n.2 (sum-
mary judgment); Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 778-85, 393 N.E.2d 847, 851-54 
(discovery order). 
Another decision during the Survey year held that an order by the Appellate Division of the 
District Court remanding a case for a new trial is not a "final decision" which may be ap-
pealed: 
The test of finality of a decision is whether it terminates the litigation on its merits, 
directs what judgment shall be entered, and leaves nothing to the judicial discretion of 
the trial court, and not whether it is the last word of the Appellate Division on the par-
ticular aspect of the litigation at the moment pending before it, directing additional pro-
ceedings before the trial judge in order that a final conclusion may thereafter be 
reached. 
Demirdjian v. Star Market Co., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2305, 2305, 412 N.E.2d 876, 876. See 
also Pupillo v. N. Eng. Telephone & Tel. Co., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2301, 2302, 412 N.E.2d 
33S, 336 (Appellate Division's decision in a case transferred from the Superior Court to 
District Court is not final decision appealable to Supreme Judicial Court; case must be 
retransferred to Superior Court). 
' Packaging Industries, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1193,405 N.E.2d at 109. The Packaging In-
dustries case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court from the Appeals Court. Id. at 
1190, 40S N.E.2d at 108. See MASS. R. APP. P. 11; G.L. c. 211A, §§ 10-12. 
• Demoulas Super Markets, Inc. v. Peter's Market Basket, Inc., S Mass. App. Ct. 1SO, 7S2, 
29
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pedited basis. 7 The trial court is not divested of jurisdiction during the 
pendency of the appeal. • Packaging Industries also· emphasized that in-
terlocutory review of preliminary injunction decisions is ''not mandatory, 
but permissive";' a party may bypass the appeal authorized by the second 
paragraph and still challenge the interlocutory order on appeal from the 
final judgment. 10 
The standard of review on an appeal under the second paragraph is 
whether the trial court "abused its discretion." 11 Packaging Industries cau-
tioned, however, that the appellate court is not to be a mere rubber stamp 
for preliminary injunction decisions made by the trial judge. 12 Rather, the 
appellate court must "look to the same factors properly considered by the 
judge in the first instance." 13 The appellate court should subject conclu-
sions of law to broad review and draw its own conclusions from documen-
tary evidence. 14 At the same time, however, it should respect the trial 
court's assessment of the credibility of other evidence." 
The vehicle provided by the second paragraph of section 118 for in-
terlocutory review of preliminary injunction decisions is better understood 
against the backdrop of other means of obtaining interlocutory review. 
Confusion is most likely to arise from a comparison of the second 
paragraph with the frrst paragraph of section 118. 16 The first paragraph of 
section 118 permits appellate review of any interlocutory order (including, 
but not limited to, a preliminary injunction decision) entered by a superior 
court or housing court judge.U Rather than appealing to the full bench, 
review is obtained by filing a ''petition for relief'' with a single justice of the 
Appeals Court or Supreme Judicial Court. 11 The petition for relief, being 
370 N.E.2d 719,720 (1977). See MASS. R. APP. P. 3, 8-10. The interlocutory order which is the 
subject of the appeal must also " 'grant or protect at least part of the permanent relief sought 
as an ultimate result of the action.' "Packaging Industries, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1192, 405 
N.E.2d at 109 (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcnCE & PROCEDURE, § 3291 
at 10 (1977)). 
1 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1193,405 N.E.2d at 110. The opinion did indicate that this rule 
might be qualified in "exigent circumstances." /d. Interim relief is available from a single 
justice, however, under MASs. R. APP. P. 6(a) or G.L. c. 231, § 118, para. 1./d. at 1193-94, 
405 N.E.2d at 110. 
• Id. at 1193, 405 N.E.2d at 109. 
' /d. at 1192-93, 405 N.E.2d at 109. 
10 ld. 
" /d. at 1195, 405 N.E.2d at 110. 
12 Id. at 1195, 405 N.E.2d at 111. 
" /d. 
14 /d. 
" /d. at 1196, 405 N.E.2d at 111. 
" /d. at 1193 n.8, 405 N.E.2d at 110 n.8. This issue was addressed in an Appeals Court 
rescript opinion during the Survey year. Ott v. Preferred Truck Leasing, Inc., 1980 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. 513, 401 N.E.2d 866. 
17 G.L. c. 231, § 118 para. 1. 
11 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1193 n.8, 405 N.E.2d at 110 n.8. In Rollins Environmental Serv-
ices, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 175 n.1, 330 N.E.2d 814, 815 n.1 (1975), Justice 30
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interlocutory, is addressed to the single justice's "discretionary powers." 19 
The single justice's decision, moreover, may not be appealed to the full 
bench, unless the single justice authorizes an appeal. 20 
Other methods of obtaining immediate appellate review of interlocutory 
orders entered in civil cases also exist. These methods, however, are also 
discretionary or limited to peculiar circumstances. The principal method 
used to obtain immedi~te appellate review is a "report" pursuant to MASS. 
R. CIV. P. 64 by the judge who entered the order. 21 The doctrine of "pre-
sent execution," which is analogous to the collateral order doctrine in 
federal court practice, 22 also provides a limited, nonstatutory exception to 
the general rule barring appellate review of interlocutory orders. 23 The 
power of superintendance over lower courts vested in the Supreme Judicial 
Court by chapter 211, section 3, provides a third avenue for immediate 
review of interlocutory orders. 24 However, the "discretionary relief" 
available from a single justice under chapter 211, section 3 can be obtained 
only in "exceptional circumstances when necessary to protect substantial 
rights. ms These three avenues of securing appellate review recede in impor-
tance, however, in the numerous cases covered by chapter 231, section 118 
for 'Yhich the legislature has expanded the scope of interlocutory appeals. 
The Packaging Industries decision will aid practitioners because it 
distinguishes the review available under the first and second paragraphs of 
section 118. 
Quirico said the initial pleading under § 118, para. 1 is properly labeled a complaint, but the 
statutory term "petition" has become the dominant usage. Labels aside, the significant point is 
that review under the first paragraph partakes of the nature of an original action, while review 
under the second paragraph is obtained by filing an ordinary appeal. 
" Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 181, 330 N.E.2d 
814, 818. 
'
0 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1194, 405 N.E.2d at 110. 
" E.g., Commonwealth v. Town of Andover, 378 Mass. 370, 376, 391 N.E.2d 1225, 
1229-30; Nat'l Assn. of Government Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp. 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2485, 2486 n.2, 398 N.E.2d 996, 998 n.2. G.L. c. 231, § 111. 
" The collateral order doctrine is derived from the decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
" Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 780, 393 N.E.2d 847, 852. In the Borman case the 
Court held the present execution doctrine permitted immediate appellate review of an order 
disqualifying the plaintiff's counsel but did not permit immediate review of an order denying 
defendant's claim that the privilege against self-incrimination shielded her from answering cer-
tain questions at a deposition. /d. at 780-82, 393 N.E.2d at 852-53. Cf Ott v. Preferred Truck 
Leasing, Inc., 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 513, 401 N.E.2d 866. Compare the more recent 
holding by the U.S. Supreme Court that the collateral order doctrine does not permit im-
mediate appellate review of orders denying requests to disqualify opposing counsel. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 
" G.L. c. 211, § 3. 
" Cappadona v. Riverside 400 Function Room, Inc., 372 Mass. 167, 168, 360 N.E.2d 1048, 
1050 (1977). The Cappadona opinio•1 <~lso stated: "Future attempts to invoke our powers 
under G.L. c. 211, § 3, for further appellate review of interlocutory orders in any but the most 
unusual circumstances may well b.: regarded as frivolous appeals and hence subject to MASs. 31
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§ 9.5 Limitation of Actions-Medical Malpractice. Disparate applica-
tions of the statutes of limitations for medical and legal malpractice claims 
were eliminated by an important decision during the Survey year, Franklin 
v. Albert. 1 In both legal and medical malpractice cases, a court must deter-
mine when the cause of action accrued in order to know whether the time-
bar specified by the Legislature has run. For suits against lawyers, the Court 
adopted the more modern "discovery" rule in a 1974legal malpractice case, 
Hendrickson v. Sears. 2 For suits against physicians, however, the Court 
continued to adhere to the traditional "occurrence" rule adopted in its 
earlier medical malpractice decisions. Under the occurrence rule the cause 
of action was deemed to accrue "at the time of the [act of malpractice], 
'and not when the actual damage results or is ascertained.' " 3 Franklin 
overruled these medical malpractice precedents and substituted the 
discovery rule for the occurrence rule. Consequently, in Massachusetts, as 
in 41 other jurisdictions, 4 medical malpractice actions now accrue when the 
"patient learns, or reasonably should have learned, that he has been 
harmed as a result of a defendant's conduct."' 
The facts of the Franklin case illuminate the difference between the 
discovery rule adopted by the Court and the occurrence test it replaced. A 
chest X-ray of the patient, Franklin, was taken in 1974 while he was 
hospitalized for oral surgery. Albert, the defendant, was the physician who 
discharged Franklin from the hospital. Dr. Albert indicated on his 
R. APP. P. 25 authorizing awards of double costs in such cases." Id. at 170, 360 N.E.2d at 
1051. 
In Fadden v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604, 608, 382 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (1978), the Court 
said it would not delegate its powers of superintendance under G.L. c. 211, § 3 to the-Appeals 
Court. It did countenance a procedure whereby a "single justice of this court may in a proper 
case exercise the power of superintendance by allowing interlocutory review of a double 
jeopardy claim of substantial merit and then transfer the case to a single justice of the Appeals 
Court for decision on the merits of the double jeopardy claims." · 
§ 9.5 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2187,411 N.E.2d 458. See also the companion case, Teller v. 
Schepens, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2199, 411 N.E.2d 464, discussed in text at note 54 infra. 
' 365 Mass. 83,83-84, 310 N.E.2d 131, 132 (1974). The discovery rule dates the accrual of a 
cause of action from the time that the plaintiff discovers that he has been harmed by a 
negligent act, rather than from the time of the "occurrence" of the negligent act itself. See text 
at notes S and 24 infra. The Court also referred to the modernity of this trend in ·Pasquale v. 
Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 456 & n.2, 215 N.E.2d 319, 322 & n.2 (1966); and in Franklin, 1980, 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2195, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
• Pasquile v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 4SO, 456, 215 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1966). The Court refer-
red to the occurrence rule as the "traditional view" in Hendrickson v. Se8rs, 365 Mass. 83, 86, 
310 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1974). 
• Sonenshein, A Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice: M~achusetts Joins the Fold, 3 
W. NBWENQ. L. REV. 433,433 &n.1 (1981); see also Annot., 80A.L.R.2d 368, § 7(b) (1961 & 
Later Case Service 167 (1979)). The Franklin opinion noted that it was bringing Massachusetts 
lawinto line with the "vast majority" of other states, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at Z19S, 411 N.E.2d 
at 463. 
• FrankHn, 1980 Mass. Adv • .Sh. at 2188,411 N.E.2d at 460. 
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discharge summary that Franklin's X-ray had been normal. In fact, 
however, the report prepared by the hospital's X-ray department had noted 
an apparent abnormality and had recommended further evaluation of 
Franklin's condition. Four years later another chest X-ray of Franklin in 
the same hospital revealed a lesion which was diagnosed as Hodgkin's 
disease. In 1978, six months after learning of the findings of the 1974 X-ray, 
Franklin sued both Dr. Albert and the hospital. 6 
Franklin alleged in his lawsuit that the first X-ray revealed an early 
manifestation of Hodgkin's disease and that Dr. Albert had been negligent 
in failing to inform Franklin about the abnormality and in failing to 
prescribe the recommended further evaluation. The case was initially refer-
red to a medical malpractice tribunal' which found that the evidence 
"raise[d] a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial 
inquiry."' The superior court, nevertheless, entered summary judgment for 
the defendants because the three year limitations period for medical 
malpractice actions9 had expired before Franklin sued. 10 On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the superior court's ruling had been cor-
rect under existing Massachusetts case law defining when a medical 
malpractice action ''accrues.'' 11 However, the Court sharply criticized these 
precedents, and explicitly overruled them. 12 
The earlier of the overruled decisions, Capucci v. Barone, involved a 
plaintiff who persistently complained about pains following abdominal 
surgery. Two years and two months after the first operation, another 
surgeon performed a second operation and discovered a left-over surgical 
sponge. 13 Capucci held that the plaintiff's lawsuit against the first doctor, 
which had been filed promptly after discovery of the sponge, was time-
barred. The cause of action accrued, the opinion said, when the physician 
committed "[a]ny act of misconduct or negligence," not when the "actual 
damage results or is ascertained." 14 In a 1966 decision, Pasquale v. 
• Id. at 2188-89, 411 N.E.2d at 460. 
' See G.L. c. 231, § 608. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2188-89, 411 N.E.2d at 460. 
' See G.L. c. 260, § 4 which provides, in pertinent part: "Actions of contract or tort for 
malpractice, error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals 
and sanitoria . . . shall be commenced only within three years after the cause of action 
accrues." 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2189, 411 N.E.2d at 460. 
11 Id. at 2196, 411 N.E.2d at 464. 
12 /d. at 2188, 411 N.E.2d at 459-60. 
" Capucci v. Barrone, 266 Mass. 578, 579-80, 165 N.E. 653, 654 (1929). 
•• Id. at 581, 165 N.E. at654-55. The Court explained that the doctor's negligence "was a 
breach of his contract." I d. Franklin observed that in Capucci "[n)o suggestion was offered as 
to how an injured plaintiff could pursue his theoretical right of action before he had any 
chance to discover he had been injured." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2190,411 N.E.2d at 460. A 
negligence action ordinarily does not accrue before the plaintiff knew he suffered damages. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 281 (1965). Compare Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co:, 
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Chandler, the Court reluctantly reaffirmed the Cappucci "occurrence" 
test. 15 
In Franklin, the defendants argued that the Court was bound by Pasquale 
to use the occurrence test to determine when the plaintiff's cause of action 
accrued. The Court disagreed, 16 explaining that the rule was unfair to plain-
tiffs like Franklin, who had had no way o( knowing about the abnormality 
on the earlier X-ray. 17 Accordingly, the Court extended to medical malprac-
tice actions the principle that a claim should not be time-barred before a 
plaintiff has "notice" of its existence. 18 
The Franklin court noted that use of the occurrence test to determine 
when a cause of action accrues does effectuate the policy of repose em-
bodied in all statutes of limitations. 19 Nevertheless the Court felt that deci-
sions adopting the occurrence test gave undue weight to the policy of repose 
and did not adequately "balance the harm of being deprived of a remedy 
374 Mass. 739, 742, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978) ("A cause of action based on negligence requires 
that both negligence and harm be shown, ... ") with DiGregorio v. Commonwealth, 1980 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 15'59, 407 N.E.2d 1323, 1324 ("A cause of action for breach of con-
tract accrues at the time of the breach ... even if the amount of damages is unknown at the 
time of the breach and even though the damages may not be sustained until later.") See also 
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1200-04 (1950); 
Sonenshein, supra note 4, at 436-44. 
" 350 Mass. 450, 458, 215 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1966). Pasquale was a wrongful death action 
brought by the estate of a man who died in 1961 of multiple abscesses discovered to have been 
caused by a surgical clamp left in his abdomen during ulcer surgery in 1955. Pasquale suggested 
it would have overruled Capucci but for the Legislature's recent failure to enact a "discovery 
rule" amendment to G.L. c. 260, § 4 (the statute set out at note 9 supra). /d. at 456-58. In 
Franklin, the Court again reviewed the legislative history of the failed amendment. This time 
the Court concluded that it was improper to place so much significance on the legislative 
history, since inaction was too ambiguous a fact from which to infer specific legislative intent. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2191, 411 N.E.2d at 461. See also Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 
88, 310 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1974). 
The approach the Court used in Franklin to overrule its prior decisions is markedly different 
from the approach it used to overrule its decisions on charitable immunity, Colby v. Carney 
Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 528, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969), and municipal immunity, Whitney v. 
City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 210, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). These decisions announced the 
Court's intention to overrule the immunity doctrines in the next case to come before it, giving 
the Legislature an opportunity to act first. See G.L. c. 231, § 85K, inserted by Acts of 1971, c. 
785, § 1 and G.L. c. 258, as amended by Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. at 2190, 411 N.E.2d at 461. 
" "The manifest injustice of the Capucci doctrine is that, rather than punishing negligent 
delay by the plaintiff, it punishes 'blameless ignorance' by holding a medical malpractice ac-
tion time-barred before the plaintiff reasonably could know the harm he has suffered." /d. at 
2194, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
" /d. at 2195, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
" /d. at 2194, 411 N.E.2d at 463. "Repose" refers to the notion that social and economic 
stability is fostered by the policy that, after a certain amount of time, legal claims must be 
manifest or expire. The other policy promoted by statutes of limitations is to ensure that the 
evidence is "fresh and available." /d. See generally Developments, supra note 14, at 1185-86. 
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versus the harm of being sued. " 20 Adoption of a "discovery" rule would, 
Franklin implied, better promote this balance. Although the Court could 
not extend the three-year limitations period set by the Legislature, it could 
modify the statute's impact by altering its interpretation of "accrues,"21 so 
that non-obvious injuries would not be time-barred prior to theil' discovery. 
"Absent explicit legislative direction," the Court said, "the determination 
of when a cause of action accrues, causing the statute of limitations to run, 
has long been the product of judicial interpretation in this 
Commonwealth."22 Accordingly, abandonment of the occurrence test was 
within the ambit of judicial discretion. 
The operation of the discovery rule adopted in Franklin can be tersely 
described. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is 
waived if it is not asserted in the defendant's Answer. 23 Ordinarily, a judge 
can decide whether the defense should be sustained simply by looking at the 
period of time that has elapsed between the occurrence of the event which is 
the basis for the plaintiff's claim and the commencement of the lawsuit. 
Since most harm is obvious when it occurs, there is usually no need to resort 
to the discovery rule. However, if a plaintiff suffers harm which is not ob-
vious when it occurs, use of the discovery rule may allow him to pursue a 
lawsuit after the statute of limitations would otherwise appear to have run. 
In such a case, the plaintiff can avoid dismissal of his lawsuit by showing 
that at the time of the incident he neither knew, nor reasonably could have 
known, that it would give rise to the cause of action. 24 
As the cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court indicate, the situa-
tions in which long periods of time elapse between occurrence of a wrong 
and obvious injury to a plaintiff are frequently those in which the plaintiff 
has relied upon expert advice. In a series of decisions, beginning with 
Hendrickson v. Sears25 in 1974 and culminating with Franklin, the Court 
has consistently applied the discovery rule where members of various pro-
fessions have pleaded the statute of limitations defense. In Hendrickson, 
the Court explained its rationale for using the discovery rule in language 
that prefigured the Franklin decision: 
The attorney, like the doctor, is an expert, and much of his work is 
done out of the client's view. The client is not an expert; he cannot be 
'
0 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2193, 4ll N.E.2d at 462. 
" /d. 
" /d. Accordingly, "[t]his court is not barred from departing from that rule if persuaded 
that the values in so doing outweigh the values underlying stare decisis." /d. 
" MASs. R. Crv. P. 8(c). 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2188, 4ll N.E.2d at 459-60. Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 
91, 310 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1974). On this issue, the plaintiff has the burden of proof. 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 21%, 4ll N.E.2d at 464. 
" 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974). See also Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 
Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978) (products liability cause of action accrues at time of injury, 
not at time of negligent manufacture or sale). 
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expected to recognize professional negligence if he sees it, and he 
should not be expected to watch over the professional or to retain a 
second professional to do so. 26 
This formulation recognizes that some problems may be identified only by 
persons with special knowledge or expertise. 27 
The plaintiffs in Hendrickson, for example, had hired an attorney to 
search the title to real estate which they planned to purchase. Their attorney 
certified that the title was "valid, clear and marketable"; but when the 
plaintiffs tried to sell the property nine years later they discovered that the 
title was encumbered by an easement. 21 The defendant argued that the 
"legal profession in Massachusetts should be held to the same rules as the 
medical profession" 29 and urged the Court to apply the Capucci rule to his 
statute of limitations defense. 30 The Court declined to do so, stating that 
adoption of Capucci's occurrence test would provide lawyers with an incen-
tive to breach their fiduciary duties to their clients. 31 
A 1976 case, Friedman v. Jablonski, 32 illustrates the application of the 
discovery rule-and its limits-in a slightly different context. There, pur-
chasers of real estate sued the sellers and their broker, charging that 
fraudulent misrepresentations had been made during the sale. The plain-
tiffs, who filed the action more than two years after the sale, 33 sought to 
avoid dismissal under the statute of limitations. Relying on Hendrickson, 34 
the plaintiffs asserted that their cause of action did not accrue until they 
"knew or reasonably should have known of the misrepresentations. " 35 The 
Court analyzed how the discovery rule might apply to each of the plaintiff's 
two claims: a misrepresentation that there was a right of way across 
neighboring property and a misrepresentation that an artesian well was 
located on the property. 36 
Friedman held that the plaintiffs' right of way claim was barred by the 
" 365 Mass. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135. 
27 The other situation in which courts are likely to adopt a discovery rule is when the time at 
which an injury occurs is "inherently unknowable." E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 
169 (1949); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 145, 181 N.E.2d 562, 568{1962)(dissenting 
opinion). 
21 365 Mass, at 84, 310 N.E.2d at 132. See G.L. c. 93, § 70, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 
448, for a special rule for title certifications where the "mortgagor is required or agrees to pay 
... any fee [for] ... an attorney acting for or on behalf of the mortgagee." 
" Id. at 87, 310 N.E.2d at 134. -
•• /d. 
" /d. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135. 
32 371 Mass. 482, 358 N.E.2d 994 (1976). 
" /d. at 484, 358 N.E.2dat 996. G.L. c. 260 § 2A. The limitations period was subsequently 
increased to three years by Acts of 1973, c. 777, § 1. 
14 365 Mass. at 91, 310 N.E.2d at 136. 
" 371 Mass. at 484, 358 N.E.2d at 996. 
,, Id. at 483-84, 486-87, 358 N.E.2d at 996, 997-98. 
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statute of limitations "as [a] matter of law." 37 Because the existence of the 
right of way was a recorded property interest, the Court explained, it was 
not "inherently unknowable." 38 Consequently, the purchasers could have 
learned of the right of way if they had employed an attorney to perform a 
title search. 39 The discovery rule, in other words, applied only to representa-
tions which the plaintiffs, in the exercise of "due diligence," could not have 
learned were false until after the sale. 40 However, the Court felt that the 
plaintiff's second claim that the sellers falsely represented there was an arte-
sian well on the land should be treated differently. As to this claim, the 
Friedman Court concluded that the plaintiff's due diligence presented a 
question of fact, because it was unlikely that a title search would have 
revealed the location of the well. Hence, the plaintiffs could overcome the 
statute of limitations defense if they presented facts which established that 
"they should not have known of the location of the well until within two 
years of the commencement of this action."41 
The issue of fraud deserves attention in connection with the discovery 
rule adopted by Franklin, 42 Friedman, 43 and Hendrickson. •• A Massachu-
setts statute provides that the statute of limitations shall be tolled where the 
existence of a cause of action is "fraudulently concealed" from the injured 
party. 45 Under the fraudulent concealment statute the "period prior to the 
discovery" of the cause of action is simply excluded from the limitations 
period. 46 However, this statute has not proved itself adequate to temper the 
harsh results obtained under the occurrence test. In the seminal decision of 
Capucci v. Barone,•' for example, the plaintiff's argument that the facts, 
while not showing deliberate concealment by the doctor of his malpractice, 
nevertheless brought the case " 'within the equity' of the fraudulent con-
cealment statute" did not prevail. 48 
The Friedman decision also illustrates that the fraudulent concealment 
statute provides a narrower tolling principle than the discovery rule. In 
Friedman, the plaintiffs charged fraudulent misrepresentations were made 
" /d. at 486, 358 N.E.2d at 997. 
"Id. 
" /d. Had the purchasers relied on a misstatement of their own attorney concerning the 
right of way, the Court indicated that they might have a claim against their attorney which 
would not have been time-barred under the Hendrickson discovery rule. /d. at 486 n.4, 358 
N.E.2d at 997 n.4. 
40 Id. at 486, 358 N.E.2d at 997. 
4
' /d. at 487, 358 N.E.2dat 998. 
42 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2187, 411 N.E.2d 464. 
4
' 371 Mass. 482, 358 N.E.2d 994 (1976). 
44 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974). 
4
' G.L. c. 260, § 12. 
46 /d. 
47 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929). 
41 /d. at 581, 165 N.E. at 655. 
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in the land sale, but they could not secure the protection of the fraudulent 
concealment statute because they were unable to aver that the sellers and the 
broker made efforts to conceal their cause of action. 49 The Friedman opin-
ion, while acknowledging there were factual allegations "constituting 
fraud," 50 held that fraudulent concealment required "positive acts:" in the 
"absence of a fiduciary relationship silence cannot constitute fraudulent 
concealment.'''' There was no duty of disclosure in Friedman because the 
broker's fiduciary duty was to the seller, not to the plaintiffs-purchasers. 52 
The fraudulent concealment statute did not help the plaintiffs overcome 
the statute of limitations in the Franklin and Hendrickson cases for a dif-
ferent reason. While there were fiduciary relationships between the parties 
in both Franklin (doctor-patient) and Hendrickson (attorney-client), there 
was no evidence in either case that the "silence" ofthe fiduciaries was based 
on deliberate concealment of the cause of action. Instead, the doctor's 
failure to reveal the X-ray fmdings in Franklin and the attorney's failure to 
uncover the title encumbrance in Hendrickson were negligent rather than 
fraudulent. Only if the fiduciaries had subsequently realized their negli-
gence and thereafter contrived to protect themselves through nondisclosure 
would Franklin and Hendrickson appear to fall within the fraudulent con-
cealment principle. 53 
Thus, the discovery rule adopted in Franklin is both preferable to the 
Capucci occurrence rule and a necessary supplement to the fraudulent con-
cealment statute. Nevertheless, use of the discovery rule may produce 
" 371 Mass. at 485 n.3, 358 N.E.2d at 997 n.3. 
•• /d. at 488-89, 358 N.E.2d at 998-99. 
" /d. at 485 n.3, 358 N.E.2d at 997 n.3. See also O'Brien v. McSherry, 222 Mass. 147, 150, 
109 N.E. 904 (1915). 
" 371 Mass. at 485, 358 N.E.2d at 997. This case, then, illustrates the need for a discovery 
rule independent of G.L. c. 260, § 12. Even if the defendant-broker had a fiduciary relation-
ship with the plaintiff-purchasers, no fiduciary relationship would exist between the principals 
to the transaction, the sellers and purchasers of the real estate. See further Frank Cooke, Inc. 
v. Hurtwitz, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1197, 1206, 406 N.E.2d 678, 684. 
" See Hendrickson, 365 Mass. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135. Attorneys, at least, are held to a 
duty of full disclosure. /d. See Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
1204, 406 N.E.2d at 685 (G.L. c. 260, § 12 tolls the statute of limitations "if the wrongdoer, 
either through actual fraud or in breach of a fiduciary duty of full disclosure, keeps from the 
injured person knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of action and the means of acquir-
ing knowledge of such facts."). 
The extent of physicians' duty to make disclosures to their patients is controversial, varies 
widely from state to state, and is undergoing rapid judicial expansion. Several courts have held 
that deliberate nondisclosure to patients by physicians of negligently-caused harms tolled the 
statutes of limitations. Lynch v. Rubacky, 424 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1981); Garcia v. Presbyterian 
Hospital Center, 593 P.2d 407 (N.M. App. 1974) See also Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. 
Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980) Simcuski v. Saeli, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 
(1978); State ex rei. Sperandio v. Clymer, 563 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. App. 1978); Haggerty v. Mc-
Carthy, 344 Mass. 136, 145, 181 N.E.2d 562, 568 (1962) (dissenting opinion). 
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undesirable results. One problem is illustrated by Teller v. Schepens, 54 the 
companion case to Franklin. The plaintiff in Teller had three eye opera-
tions, and seven weeks after the final operation the plaintiff was informed 
he would not recover his vision. 55 Three years less two days later the plain-
tiff filed a malpractice action and encountered a statute of limitations 
defense. The decisive question was whether the cause of action accrued at 
the time of the third operation, which would bar the lawsuit, or at the time 
the plaintiff learned the results of the operation, which would allow the suit 
to proceed. The Supreme Judicial Court applied the discovery test it had 
adopted in Franklin. Use of the discovery rule instead of the occurrence test 
in Teller extended the limitations period by the seven week period, and thus 
the plaintiff's suit survived the time bar by a two day margin. 56 Arguably, 
nothing turns on the seven weeks grace the tardy plaintiff received in Teller, 
but the ''balance of the harm of being deprived of a remedy versus the harm 
of being sued" 57 shifts when the Teller holding is applied, for example, to 
the facts of the Hendrickson litigation. In Hendrickson, the client first 
learned of his attorney's malpractice when he sought to sell real estate nine 
years after the attorney certified the title. 58 The client filed suit against the 
lawyer four months thereafter, 59 but under Teller the plaintiff would be 
allowed to tack the full statute of limitations period60 onto the nine year 
"discovery" period. The unsettling impact that this could have on the 
underlying policies of repose and access to evidence is plain. 61 
Glancing attention was paid to this problem in the Franklin opinion 
where the Court referred to the possible creation of an "outside limit" 62 on 
the time in which an action might be brought. To illustrate, use of an out-
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2199, 411 N.E.2d 464. 
" /d. at 2200, 411 N.E.2d at 465. 
" /d. at 2201, 411 N.E.2d at 466. By contrast, in Franklin the plaintiff filed suit within six 
months after discovery of the alleged malpractice. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2189,411 N.E.2d at 
460. Thus it seemed appropriate in Franklin-but not in Teller-to say that the occurrence test 
"rather than punishing negligent delay by the plaintiff, punishes 'blameless ignorance' "/d. at 
2194, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
" See text at note 20 supra. 
" 365 Mass. at 84, 310 N.E.2d at 132. 
,. /d. 
•• The Hendrickson decision left unresolved whether the applicable limitations period for 
legal malpractice is six years (G.L. c. 260, § 2) or three years (G.L. c. 260, § 2A). /d. at 86, 310 
N.E.2d at 133. See also McStow v. Bornstein, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1024, 1030-31, 388 N.E.2d 
674 (legal malpractice sounds in contract but issue of which statute of limitations is appropriate 
left unresolved); Town of Nantucket v. Beinecke, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2623, 2626 n.4, 398 
N.E.2d 458 (same). See also Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
1197, 406 N.E.2d 678; Annot., 2 A.L.R.4th 284 (1980). 
" See text and note at note 19 supra. See also Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 
739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
'' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2195, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
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side limit-also termed a "sliding scale discovery rule" 63-would require a 
suit to be filed three years after an injury occurred (the statute of limitations 
period), but no more than seven years after the transaction or occurrence 
which gave rise to the cause of action (the outside limit). Franklin did not 
adopt an outside limit on the discovery rule because, in the Court's opinion, 
such a solution requires Legislative action. 64 
Although it is a salutary response to protracted extensions of the limita-
tions period under the discovery rule, the "outer limit" approach to statutes 
of limitations will occasionally yield the same harsh result as the discarded 
occurrence test. The plaintiff in Hendrickson, for example, would have 
been time-barred by an outer limit of seven years, even though he sued 
promptly after learning of the attorney's malpractice. At the same time, the 
"outer limit" may work to the defendant's detriment by permitting the 
plaintiff to delay filing suit long after discovery of the cause of action. A 
possible solution is for either the Court or Legislature to require the suit to 
be filed within a "reasonable time" when a plaintiff invokes the discovery 
rule in response to a statute of limitations defense. 6 ' 
§ 9.6. Discovery-Work Product Rule. In 1947 the United States 
Supreme Court held in Hickman v. Taylor' that the pre-trial discovery pro-
visions in the recently adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 were 
limited by the attorney "work product" doctrine. 3 Although the work 
product limitation on discovery in civil actions• subsequently met with 
widespread acceptance, the Supreme Judicial Court never had occasion to 
expressly adopt the work product doctrine in Massachusetts.' In 1970, 
however, amendments to the federal pretrial discovery rules substantially 
" Pasquale, 350 Mass. at 458, 215 N.E.2d at 323. See, e.g., G.L. c. 260, § 28. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2195, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
" See, e.g., G.L. c. 260, § 48 (tort claims arising out of hit and run accidents may be 
brought within six months after the plaintiff learns the identity of the defendant but not more 
than three years after the accident). Although the matter is not free from difficulty, the Court 
should be able to use estoppel or laches principles to attain this result. See Developments, supra 
note 14, at 1184, 1222. Cj. Commonwealth v. One 1976 Cadillac DeVille Automobile, 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 991, 403 N.E.2d 935. 
§ 9.6. I 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
' The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in September, 1938. 
' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, describes the "attorney work product" as "writ-
ten statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an 
adverse party's CQunsel in the course of his legal duties." 
• The work product doctrine has more recently been extended to criminal practice. U.S. v. 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 23~ (1975). See also MASS. R, CRIM. P; 14(a)(5). 
' Prior to Ward v. Peabody, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1395,405 N.E;.2d 973, the work product 
doctrine was mentioned in several other MassaChusetts decisions. See, e.g., Manganno 
Drywall, Inc. v. White Construction Co., 372 Mass. 661, 363 N.E.2d 669 (1977); Ottaway 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 362 N.E.2d 1189 (1977); Comm. v. 
Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 233 N.E.2d 1 (1968); Lindsey v. Ogden, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 1243, 406 N.E.2d 701. 
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incorporated Hickman's work product doctrine into Federal Rule 26(b)(3). 6 
Hence, the work product doctrine was imported into Massachusetts practice 
when the text of Federal Rule 26(b)(3) was later adopted by the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 
In a case decided during the Survey year, Ward v. Peabody, • the Supreme 
Judicial Court initiated its first extended discussion of the work product 
doctrine. In Ward, the Legislature's Special Commission Concerning State 
and County Buildings (popularly known as the MBM Commission) issued a 
summons to Peabody, a lawyer, seeking production of records concerning 
his client, McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. (MBM). 9 MBM waived any objec-
tion to the summons based on the attorney-client privilege. 10 Peabody, 
nevertheless, resisted production of the documents, partly on the ground 
that the work product doctrine protected three categories of documents 
sought by the Special Commission: " ... (3) investigation of new business 
possibilities for MBM and advice in connection therewith; ... (5) former 
investigations of MBM or its activities proposed or ongoing at the time; 
[and] (6) contacts by the respondent [Peabody] with elected or appointed 
government officials or government employees regarding MBM; .... " 11 
The Special Commission overruled Peabody's objections to production of 
the documents and sought judicial enforcement of its summons against 
Peabody. 12 The superior court ruled against the Special Commission, 13 but 
on appeal the Supreme Judicial Court rejected Peabody's work product ob-
jection and ordered production of the documents. 14 
' Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2023 (1970). Note, however, that the coverage of Rule 
26(b)(3) is limited to "documents and tangible things" so resort to Hickman v. Taylor is still 
necessary if the work product is unwritten. See note 3 supra ("personal recollections"). FED. 
R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3) is not affected by the 1980 amendments to the federal discovery rules. See 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments, 48 USLW 4497, (May 6, 1980). 
' 365 Mass. 772-74 (1974). 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1395, 405 N.E.2d 973. 
• /d. at 1395, 405 N.E.2d at 973. The opinion states that "MBM had retained the respond-
ent [Peabody) or his frrm in order to assist the company to secure the award of the manage-
ment contract [for the construction of the University of Massachusetts campus in Boston]. The 
respondent continued to represent the company during the period in which the contract and 
performance thereunder came into question." /d. at 1399, 405 N.E.2d at 976. Peabody did 
agree to appear personally before the Special Commission. /d. at 1395, 405 N.E.2d at 974. 
•• /d. at 1395, 405 N.E.2d at 974. 
" /d. at 1400, 1401, 405 N.E.2d at 977. The superior court ruled the three categories of 
documcmts described in the text were work product; it is unclear from the opinion whether 
Peabody interposed a work product objection to production of the other eight categories of 
documents. The other objections interposed by Peabody will not be discussed. See note 14 in-
fra. 
12 /d. at 1399-400, 405 N.E.2d at 976. 
" ld. at 1401, 405 N.E.2d at 977. 
•• /d. at 1401, 1406-08,405 N.E.2d at 977, 980-81. Ward also held that the Special Commis-
sion's investigatory power had not expired, that "irrelevance of any demanded material to the 
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Unfortunately, Ward was not the ideal case for explication of the work 
product doctrine. Indeed, the opinion does not even refer to Rule 26(b)(3). 
One reason for the omission of Rule 26(b)(3) from the Court's discussion of 
the work product doctrine is that, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 1' Rule 8l(a) provides that the Massachusetts rules apply only to 
"civil proceedings in courts." 16 Peabody's objection, however, was ad-
dressed to documents sought by a legislative body, not by the opposing par-
ty in a lawsuit. 17 Since the civil rules did not apply in Ward, the Court 
reviewed the general concerns about the production of evidence which have 
arisen in the context of legislative investigations. 18 Based on this review, the 
Ward Court concluded that "legitimate claims of standard privileges," 
especially the attorney-client privilege and the privilege against self-
incrimination, may apply in this context. 19 Nevertheless, the Court carefully 
refrained from deciding whether the work product doctrine applies in the 
context of legislative investigations. 20 Instead, it determined that the 
purposes of the [Legislature's) resolve [creating the Special Commission) would be a ground 
[for denying production of the documents], and in that connection consideration of privacy in-
terests should play a part." /d. at 1401-02, 405 N.E.2d at 977. 
" FED. R. C1v. P. 8l(a)(3) (rules apply to "proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or 
production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the 
United States."); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1981). 
" A second reason that Rule 26(b)(3) is omitted from the Court's discussion is that the 
Legislature's resolve creating the Special Commission provided that compulsory process issued 
by the Commission to obtain witness testimony or documents should conform to the standards 
for criminal, not civil, cases. Ward, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1408 n.l3, 405 N.E.2d at 981 n.l3. 
While Rule l4(a)(5) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure does preclude discovery 
of the opponent's work product in criminal cases, it does so in terms which are different from 
the civil rule. Ward is not an explication of Rule l4(a)(5) either; in a footnote the Court tersely 
states that "[f)or the reasons we have suggested, the [criminal] rule is not 'applicable' here." 
/d. Indeed, the exceptions to the work product doctrine upon which the Court bases its deci-
sion do not appear in the text of Rule l4(a)(5). 
" /d. at 1395, 405 N.E.2d at 974. 
" /d. at 1402-03, 405 N.E.2d at 977-78. 
" /d. at 1403, 405 N.E.2d at 978. 
'" /d. at 1408, 405 N.E.2d at 981 ("[w)e are not to be understood as saying that the work 
product idea, or some implication from it, can never apply in a legislative investigation. It is 
fair to add, however, that we have not yet seen a decision where work product has been applied 
in that context."). Compare Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (applying 
work product protection to Internal Revenue Service's investigatory summons). 
A case decided after Ward v. Peabody is relevant to the general issue of judicial supervision 
of the investigative power. In re Roche, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2203, 4ll N.E.2d 466, applica-
tion for stay granted, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J.), upheld an order holding a television 
news reporter in contempt of court for failure to testify in connection with proceedings by the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, but the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the judicial duty 
to assure that discovery is not "oppressive." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2215, 4ll N.E.2d at 475. 
See also Ward, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1403,405 N.E.2d at 978 (stressing Court's concern with 
"protection against harassing tactics unjustified by the requirements of sober investigation"); 
id. at 1408-10, 405 N.E.2d at 981-82 (privacy interest as independent bar to discovery). 
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documents sought by the Special Commission fell within exceptions to the 
work product doctrine and relied on these exceptions to overrule Peabody's 
objection. 21 
The principal reason the Ward Court gave for overruling Peabody's work 
product objection is that the work product doctrine shields only documents 
prepared for litigation. In this case, the Court concluded, "at least some" 
of the summoned documents concerned "efforts to obtain business for 
MBM," and bore no relationship to litigation.zz This basis for the Court's 
decision is consistent with the terms of Massachusetts Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(3), which provides that, to elude discovery, documents must be 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." It is also consistent with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman, which derived the work product 
doctrine from the "public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and 
defense of legal claims" and from the lawyer's role in the adversary 
system. Z3 The "anticipation of litigation" qualification to the work product 
doctrine thus explains why the Special Commission was entitled to 
documents concerning Peabody's efforts to develop "new business 
possibilities" for MBM or Peabody's contacts with "government officials" 
on. MBM's behalf. 24 Even if Peabody was thrust into an adversarial role 
when the Special Commission inquired into MBM's affairs, the documents 
in question were created for a different purpose and Peabody performed a 
different role at the time of their creation. 
The anticipation of litigation qualification does not satisfactorily explain, 
however, why the work product doctrine did not shield the documents con-
cerning "former investigations of MBM" which were also sought by the 
Special .Commission. 25 The opinion does not elucidate the nature of these 
"former investigations," but it seems unlikely the documents are fairly 
characterized as part of the MBM lawyers' trial preparation. 26 Nevertheless, 
documents related to an investigation might have been prepared in "an-
ticipation" of litigation for, as Ward recognized, under the work product 
doctrine the litigation may be "pending or prospective. " 27 In Hickman, for 
example, the Supreme Court barred discovery of an attorney's notes of in-
" ld. at 1407, 1408, 405 N.E.2d at 980, 981. 
" ld. at 1407,405 N.E.2d at 980. The Court did not determine whether Peabody was acting 
as MBM's attorney. See MASs. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3) which refers to the "party's representative 
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent)." 
" 329 U.S. at 510, 511. 
" Ward stated "at least some" of the documents concerned efforts to "obtain business for 
MBM." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1407,405 N.E.2d at 980. See the third and sixth categories of 
documents sought by the Special Commission in the text at note ll supra. 
" See the fifth category of documents sought by the Special Commission in the text at note 
11 supra. 
26 See Ward, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1400 n.3, 405 N.E.2d at 977 n.3 ("Our summary of the 
eleven groupings [of documents sought by the Commission) omits various details."). 
" Id. at 1407, 405 N.E.2d at 980. 
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terviews with witnesses to an accident which were conducted before his 
client was sued. 28 Since Hickman, courts have consistently held that docu-
ments prepared with a "reasonable expectation" that litigation would result 
are protected, and the fact that hindsight proves the forecast wrong is irrele-
vant. 29 Viewed against the express language of the rule of civil procedure 
and the background of the work product doctrine it seems imprudent to 
read Ward as a precedent narrowly defining what documents satisfy the an-
ticipation of litigation test. Instead, the claim that the documents concern-
ing former investigations were protected by the work product doctrine was 
rejected on the narrow ground that Peabody failed to demonstrate the 
"necessary relation to litigation, pending or prospective." 30 
Ward went on to advance other reasons for rejecting Peabody's assertion 
of the work product doctrine. One reason, the Court stated, is that ''the oc-
casions for the writing of these papers are long past, and as far as appears 
neither the papers nor their substantial equivalents are available from 
another source."31 The Court's statement invokes the "substantial need" 
or "hardship" exception to the Hickman doctrine, 32 one that is embodied in 
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 33 In assaying the use of this 
exception in Ward it is important to note that nowhere does the opinion 
suggest that Peabody's "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories" 34 were embodied in the documents sought by the Special 
Commission. The omission is important because protection of the 
attorney's "mental impressions" is the fundamental purpose behind the 
qualified privilege established by Hickman 35 and documents containing 
mental impressions are afforded nearly absolute protection. 36 
,, 329 U.S. at 497 ("possible litigation"); id. at 498 ("anticipated litigation"). 
29 E.g., In ReGrand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798,803 (3d Cir. 1979). SeeS C. WRIGHT& 
A. MILLER,, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 at 198 ("Thus, the test should be 
whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, 
the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of 
litigation."). Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388, 397 (protecting documents 
prepared by corporation's in-house counsel in course of internal investigation). 
•• Ward, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1407, 405 N.E.2d at 980. 
" Id. 
32 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S; 383, 399, 
400 (rejecting government's argument that it had made a sufficient showing of "necessity" to 
overcome the work product protection). 
" The rule provides, in pertinent part, that "a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need 
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." 
34 MASS. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
" 329 U.S. at 510, 511, 513. See also id. at 517 (lawyer's memorandum of witness interview 
would be in the lawyer's "language, permeated with his inferences") (Jackson, J. concurring); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399,400. 
•• Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 400. (Rule 26 and Hickman v. Taylor accord special protection to 
work product revealing the attorney's mental processes and some lower courts have adopted an 
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The Supreme Judicial Court's application of the substantial need or hard-
ship exception to the facts of the case raises a more basic question, however. 
Ward states that "as far as appears" the documents are not available from 
another source. 37 If the record presented to the Court was unclear on this 
point, production of the records should not have been compelled. Under the 
terms of Rule 26(b)(3), the Special Commission, as "the party seeking 
discovery," and not Peabody, had the burden of demonstrating both its 
"substantial need" for the documents and its inability "without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means." 38 
The two remaining reasons Ward gave for rejecting Peabody's work pro-
duct claim are more difficult to assay. First, the Court observed that MBM, 
"an intended beneficiary of the Hickman doctrine," had both waived the 
attorney-client privilege and had not asserted any objection to production 
of the documents based on the work product doctrine. 39 The opinion did 
not, however, describe what significance the Court attributed to MBM's 
acts. While the attorney-client privilege40 and work product doctrines are 
closely related, they are not identical. The attorney-client privilege, for ex-
ample, is personal to the client and may be waived only by the client. 41 
Thus, Peabody could not, and did not, 42 base his objections on the 
attorney-client privilege after it had been waived by MBM. But, the fact 
that the documents sought by the Special Commission were not protected 
by the attorney-client privilege is not decisive because the work product doc-
absolute rule precluding discovery of an attorney's notes on interviews with witnesses; 
Supreme Court "not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by 
the work-product rule," but "far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other 
means" is required). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1407, 405 N.E.2d at 980. 
" See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at S 12 ("burden rests on the one who would invade 
that privacy to establish adequate reasons"). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1408, 405 N.E.2d at 981. 
•• The following definition of the attorney-client privilege, written by Judge Wyzanski in 
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 357-58 (D. Mass. 1950) is 
widely quoted: 
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to 
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member 
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication 
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of 
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in 
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and 
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
Massachusetts cases on the attorney client privilege include Peters v. Wallach, 366 Mass. 622, 
627, 321 N.E.2d 806 (1975) and Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 45, 144 N.E. 763, 764 (1924). See 
P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETI'S EVIDENCE 184 (5th ed. 1981) . 
., E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) EC 4-4, DR 4-101 (B)(l) and 
(C)(l) . 
., Ward, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1395, 405 N.E.2d at 974. 
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trine is broader than the attorney-client privilege in some respects. 43 In 
Hickman, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney-
client privilege did not bar discovery of the attorney's notes but the work 
product doctrine did. 44 In general, the work product doctrine erects a 
qualified immunity against discovery of the lawyer's trial preparation while 
the attorney-client privilege absolutely protects confidential communica-
tions by the client to the attorney. 4 ' The disrinctions between the two doc-
trines have led some courts to conclude that the lawyer alone can assert the 
work product objection to pre-trial discovery. 46 The cursory treatment of 
this issue in Ward should not preclude further consideration of the matter in 
a future case. 
The final reason the Court held the work product doctrine inapplicable in 
Ward is that the "words and deeds of the attorney are themselves a subject 
of relevant inquiry by the Commission. " 47 This principle seems correct, 
although it finds scant judicial support48 ~tnd should be used sparingly. 
Hickman rested on the perceived need to preserve the lawyer's role as ad-
vocate as a necessary adjunct to the adversary system of justice. 49 Thus, 
Hickman assumed both that the client's conduct was the subject of judicial 
" The work product doctrine, on the other hand, applies only in the context of litigation, 
see text at notes 22-24 supra, while the attorney-client privilege also protects confidential com-
munications seeking legal advice which do not satisfy MASs. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3)'s "in anticipa-
tion of litigation" requirement. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., at note 40 
supra. 
•• 329 U.S. at 508, 509-10. Hickman gave three re?sons the documents sought from the de-
fendant's attorney were not protected by the attorney-client privilege: (l) the attorney ob-
taim:d the information from witnesses, not from the client, (2) the documents were prepared 
by the attorney, not the client, for his own use, and (3) the documents reflected the attorney's, 
not the client's, "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories." /d. at 508. See 
also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). 
" Cf. MASS. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant .... "). 
" Lohman v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100-01, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177-78 
(19'78). The policy that an attorney should not be a witness in a lawsuit in which he appears as 
counsel lends indirect support for the result reached in the Lohman case. Borman v. Borman, 
378 Mass. 775,785-88,393 N.E.2d 847,854-56 (1979); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON· 
SIBILITY DR 5-101(B), 5-102. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 513. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1408, 405 N.E.2d at 981. 
" See id., and the discussion in 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26.64[4] at 443-47 (2d ed. 
1979). Professor Moore concludes: 
These cases indicate that when the activities of counsel are inquired into because they 
are at issue in the action before the court, there is cause for production of documents 
that deal with such activities, though they are "work product." ... When the activities 
of the attorneys are not an issue, however, it is ordinarily possible to obtain the underly-
ing factual information without raiding the attorney's file .... 
In the latter situation, Moore says, the work product should be protected from discovery. /d. 
at 447. 
" Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510, passim. ("contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly 
prosecution and defense of legal claims"). 
46
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/12
§ 9.7 CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 375 
inquiry and that the opposing party had access to the relevant information 
by means other than examining the attorney's files. ' 0 Under the work prod-
uct doctrine the client's own papers are subject to discovery and cannot be 
shielded merely by transferring custody to the attorney. H However, when 
the attorney's personal conduct is being investigated, the policies underlying 
the work product doctrine are no longer applicable because the attorney is 
stripped of his representative role in the legal system. This does not mean, 
of course, that the attorney can be forced to reveal confidential communica-
tions from a client, and the judiciary should be especially vigilant to assure 
the opposing party is not abusing the discovery rules to undermine the at-
torney's legitimate role as an advocate. 
§ 9.7. Interest-Computation. The interest to be paid on judgments 
entered in civil actions is an area of more modest appeal than the number of 
developments during the Survey year would suggest. The three develop-
ments which will be discussed 1 stem from three separate sources: a judicial 
decision, an amended court rule, and an amended statute. The principal de-
velopment came in a judicial decision, Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 2 
where the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time confronted the issue of 
when interest begins to run against a defendant who has been added to a 
torr suit long after the complaint is filed in court. 3 The relevant statute, 
chapter 231, section 6B, 4 provides that interest shall be added to judgments 
in tort actions from the "commencement" of the law suit. Section 6B thus 
gives clear guidance on how to calculate the interest to be added to a judg-
ment against the original defendant to the lawsuit. However, the statutory 
language does not expressly treat the issue posed in Bernier relating to the 
subsequently added defendant. The Court's effort to fill the statutory la-
cuna is not altogether satisfying because the Bernier opinion reached dif-
ferent results in the two companion cases which were before the Court. The 
divergent outcomes, as explained below, stem from the different methods 
used by the two plaintiffs to add the Boston Edison Company as a defend-
ant in the two cases.' 
•• /d. at 508, passim. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981) (Up-
john supplied lists of all persons who answered the corporation's questionnaire). 
" Cf Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1978); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE§ 2210 (1970). 
§ 9.7. ' See also Perkins School for the Blind v. Rate Setting Commission, 1980 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1947,411 N.E.2d 1317, discussed at note 22 infra; D. Frederico Co. v. New 
Bedford Development Authority, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 199, 203-05, 399 N.E.2d 
.1103. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 947, 403 N.E.2d 391. 
' /d. at 962, 963, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
• Until 1974, section 6B provided interest was calculated "from the date of the writ." The 
terminology was changed by Acts of 1974, c. 1114, § 155 to reflect the abolition of writs by the 
newly adopted Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 947-50, 403 N.E.2d at 393-94. 
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In Bernier litigation, two cars had collided, resulting in injuries to two 
pedestrians. In 1972, the pedestrians filed separate lawsuits against the 
drivers of the two cars. In 1974, the plaintiffs both sought to add a claim 
against a new defendant, the Boston Edison Company, for the negligent 
design, construction, and maintenance of its light pole, which had con-
tributed to their injuries after it was struck by one of the cars. One plaintiff 
(Kasputys) amended her complaint to add Edison as a defendant to her 
original action. The other plaintiff (Bernier), by contrast, started an in-
dependent action against Edison. 6 Both plaintiffs recovered against Edison, 
and the court clerk added interest to the judgments, 7 calculated from the 
commencement in 1972 of the original actions against the drivers of the 
cars. 
Edison then filed motions under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(a) to correct the judgments for clerical error, • contending the court clerk 
erred in treating Edison identically with the original defendant to the 
lawsuits.9 The superior court denied relief in both the Kasputys and Bernier 
cases. 10 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected Edison's argument 
in the Kasputys lawsuit. 11 The Court held that the calculation of interest was 
to be resolved under the language of section 6B, which turns on the question 
of whether the action against Edison was "commenced" in 1972 or in 1974. 
The statutory language, the opinion says, is to be taken "literally." 12 Con-
sequently, "[t]he fact that a defendant against whom recovery is had was 
added late in the lawsuit, should not affect the matter; the plaintiff's entitle-
ment to interest in that case also dates from the commencement of the ac-
tion."13 Therefore, Edison had to pay Kasputys interest from the commence-
ment of her original action in 1972. 14 
In contrast to Kasputys' case, the superior court was reversed in Bernier's 
case. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Bernier was not owed interest 
by Edison until1974, when he first asserted a claim against Edison." Since 
Bernier's right to interest on the judgment in his favor is based on the same 
statute as in Kasputys' case, the divergent results the Court reached in the 
• /d. at 962, 403 N.E.2d at 401. See MASS. R. C1v. P. 54(d) and (t). 
' 1980 Mas~. Adv. Sh. at 962, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
' The Court held Rule 60(a), which contains no time limits, is the "appropriate device for 
correcting a mistake in the computation of interest.'' The Court also held that Edison's motion 
pursuant to MASS. R. C1v. P. 59( e) to amend the judgments was untimely because it was not 
filed within ten days after the judgments were entered. /d. at 962 n.17, 403 N.E.2d at 401 n.17. 
' In both cases, the jury returned verdicts against Edison and the operator of one car. The 
operator of the second car was found not liable. I d. at 950, 403 N .E.2d at 394. 
•• /d. at 962, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
" /d. at 964,403 N.E.2d at 402. 
12 /d. at 963, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
u /d. 
•• /d. at 964, 403 N.E.2d at 402 . 
.. /d. 
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two cases clearly rest on sources outside section 6B. The distinction, the 
Court indicates, lies in how Kasputys and Bernier brought Edison into their 
lawsuits. 16 
Kasputys added Edison as a co-defendant to her original action by 
amending her complaint pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Ciyil Procedure 
15(a)Y While the opinion does not fully articulate the Court's reasoning, 
the amendment of the complaint brings Rule 15(c) into play. Rule 15(c), in 
turn, provides that an amendment to a pleading, "including an amendment 
changing a party," "relates back" to the original pleading if the claim 
against the new party "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence" which was the basis for the original pleading. This condition 
was satisfied in Kasputys' case, so Edison's status as a defendant "relates 
back" to 1972. Thus the Court rejected Edison's argument that it was liable 
for interest only from 1974 when it was added as a defendant. 18 
Edison's argument prevailed in Bernier's case, howeverY Bernier 
asserted his claim against Edison by filing an independent lawsuit against 
Edison. The opinion conclusorily holds that, under these circumstances, in-
terest begins to run from 1974.20 The reasoning underlying the holding is 
readily apparent, however. Bernier's action against Edison "commenced" 
when the complaint was filed in 1974,21 two years after Bernier sued the two 
drivers. Since Bernier did not resort to Rule 15(a) to add Edison as a co-
defendant by amending his original complaint, Bernier could not invoke the 
relation-back provision in Rule 15(c). Thus, although the opinion does not 
say so, ultimately it is Rule 15(c), rather than section 6B, that accounts for 
the different outcomes in the Kasputys and Bernier cases. 22 
16 /d. 
" /d. at 949, %3. 
Strictly speaking, the statement in the text is not accurate. The superior court allowed the 
amendment several months prior to the effective date of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, see MASs. R. Ctv. P. lA, on the authority of G.L. c. 231, §51, as it existed prior to its 
amendment by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 169. See also Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 85. MASs. R. Ctv. 
P. 15(c) replaced section 51 in proceedings governed by the civil rules and "codified the case 
law" that had developed under section 51. Aker v. Pearson, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 552, 554, 389 
N.E.2d 428 (1979). Thus, although the text of section 51 did not contain Rule I5(c)'s relation 
back proviso, the two provisions are equivalent. See Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 
86, 89, 223 N.E.2d 807 (1%7) (may substitute or add defendant after statute of limitations has 
run because "substitution relates back"); Walsh v. Curcio, 358 Mass. 819, 266 N.E.2d 895 
(1971) (plaintiffs may be added by amendment after statute of limitations has run). Bernier 
also acknowledged the relevance of Rule 15(c), albeit tersely, while ignoring section 51. ld. at 
%3, 403 N.E.2d at 401 ("And see, now, Mass. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 365 Mass. 761 (1974)"). Ac-
cordingly, this discussion of Bernier will continue to refer to the contemporary authority, Rule 
15(c). 
" /d. at 964, 403 N.E.2d at 402. 
" ld. 
20 /d. 
" See MASS. R. Ctv. P. 3 at note '5 infra. 
" But see note 17 supra. 
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In Bernier, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the different 
results it reached in the two cases give "an appearance of anomaly. uz3 
Nevertheless, the Court said, the outcome is "faithful to the terms" of sec-
tion 6B, the interest statute. 24 Perhaps the anomaly is minimal when viewed 
from the perspective of the two plaintiffs. Bernier, after all, could have 
secured the two years' additional interest if he had added Edison as a de-
fendant by amending his complaint under Rule! 15(a). From the defendant's 
perspective, however, the anomaly is more striking. Both Kasputys and Ber-
nier asserted the same legal claim against Edison for injuries they sustained 
from just one of Edison's poles in a single accident. In contrast to Bernier, 
Edison could do nothing to shield iteslf against paying interest back to 1972, 
or before it had notice of the claim. Considering the effect of the decision 
on Edison may lead one to conclude that the Court reached an acceptable 
solution to a knotty. problem, but still to question whether the result was 
compelled by the language of the interest statute. 
Section 6B, after all, does not define the crucial statutory phrase, "from 
the date of commencement of the action." Bernier, Without saying so, ap-
pears to borrow its definition from Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 
3. 25 If one starts with Rule 3, the conclusion that Rule 15(c) requires dif-
ferent results in the Kasputys and Bernier cases is correct. However, section 
6B itself does not incorporate the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Accordingly, the Court was free to decide that when an action is "com-
menced" for the purposes of section 6B is different than the definition sup-
plied by Rule i If Bernier had. adopted this approach, it could have 
achieved uniform results in both cases. While this may initially appear to be 
the better course to have followed, it does have two drawbacks. The 
primary drawback is that it would introduce into the procedural system two 
definitions of when an action is commenced. It is doubtful that elimination 
MASS. R. CIV. P. lS(c) was an important factor in another decision concerning interest dur-
ing the Survey year. In Perkins School for the Blind v. Rate Setting Comm'n., 1980 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1947, 411 N.B.2d 1317, the Appeals Court upheld the Perkins School's de-
mand for interest on the rate increase ordered by the Commission. The tortuous path to the 
court's result depended on the Commonwealth's presence as a party before a court in a con-
tract action for services rendered. /d. at 19Sl, 411 N.B.2d at 1320. In the case actually before 
the Appeals Court, however, the Perkins School was seeking judicial review under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14, ofthe Commission's ratemaking decision, and 
the Commonwealth was not a party. The court, citing Bernier, held this defect in the pro-
ceedings could be obviated by a remand to the superior court where the Commonwealth could 
be added as a defendant pursuant to Rule lS(a). /d. at 19S7 n.S, 19S8, 411 N.B.2d at 1324 & 
n.4. The Supreme Judicial Court subsequently accepted the Perkins School case for further ap-
pellate review pursuant to MASs. R. APP. P. 27.1. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7S. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 964, 403 N.B.2d at 402. 
24 /d. 
25 MASS. R. C1v. P. 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by (1) mailing to the clerk of 
the proper court by certified or registered mail a complaint and an entry fee prescribed by law, 
or (2) filing such complaint and an entry fee with such clerk." 
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of the anomalous outcome in Bernier is sufficient to justify the attendant ef-
fort, and possible sacrifice of clarity and certainty, that would be required 
to formulate a separate definition for section 6B. Moreover, the adoption 
of different definitions for section 6B and Rule 3 may be an even greater 
anomaly than the Bernier holding, since both definitions would apply to 
procedural problems. The second drawback to seeking uniform results in 
Bernier is that resort to a common law definition of commencement of an 
action for the purposes of section 6B would be inconsistent with the spirit of 
the procedural reform underlying the recent adoption of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules reflect a largely successful effort to 
codify all procedural rules in one place for ready reference by bench and 
bar. The Court should, therefore, resist pressures to revert to the pre-rules 
system where much procedural detail could be found only in judicial deci-
sions or in statutes. 
Although Bernier did not rely on procedural codification to justify the 
decision, the opinion is consistent with this analysis. The Court first looked 
to the underlying justification for adding interest to the judgment which is 
''to compensate for the delay in the plaintiff's obtaining his money.'' 26 Sec-
tion 6B, as the opinion notes, does not fully embrace this justification 
because '' [i]n theory interest should run from the date of the injury,'' 27 and 
not from the date the lawsuit is filed. In the Court's view, "the statute 
seems to yield to the belief that a plaintiff should not be favored with in-
terest until he has complained to the court of the injury; there may also be at 
work a notion of administrative convenience." 28 In part, this view of sec-
tion 6B supports Edison's argument that it, unlike the original defendants, 
should not be charged with interest until 1974 when Kasputys and Bernier 
notified it of their claims. 29 
By "administrative convenience" the Court evidently means that section 
6B permits the court clerk or judge to establish the date when interest begins 
to run simply by looking to the court docket (the date the action was com-
menced under Rule 3) rather than to the transcript of the evidence (the date 
of injury). Reliance on administrative convenience to justify the use of the 
docket date means, of course, that the defendant does not have to fully 
compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of the money from the date 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 963, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
27 /d. 
" /d. Contrast the measuring point for contract actions adopted by G.L. c. 231, § 6C: in-
terest runs "from the date of breach or demand." Interest runs from the "commencement of 
the action" only if neither of the earlier dates is established. Section 6C, in other words, 
manages to accommodate both "administrative convenience" and the "theory [that] interest 
should run from the date of the injury" Bernier, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 963, 403 N.E.2d at 
401. See also Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 181-82, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 
1362 (1979) (under G.L. c. 235, § 8 interest is awarded from the date a master files his report). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 962, 403 N.E.2d at 401. 
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of the plaintiff's injury until the entry of judgment. Perhaps, since section 
6B thus works to Edison's benefit no matter how it is construed, the Court 
simply felt Edison had little basis for objecting to paying Kasputys interest 
for the two year period before receiving notice of the claim. If, as the opin-
ion suggests, administrative convenience influenced the Legislature when it 
passed section 6B, considerations of convenience also lend significant sup-
port to the Court's decision to read Rule 3's definition of commencement of 
an action into section 6B. 
The Court looked to its decisions on tolling statutes of limitations for the 
second justification of the Bernier decision. These decisions, rendered 
before the adoption of the rules of civil procedure, held that filing suit 
against one defendant tolled the running of the statute and that the plaintiff 
could maintain the action against a second transaction-related defendant 
who was added to the lawsuit after the limitations period expired. 30 Massa-
chusetts' broad use of the relation-back doctrine to overcome statute of 
limitations defenses justifies, by inference, the lesser impingement on the 
defendant of using the relation-back doctrine to calculate the interest owed 
on judgments. More significantly, the Court's cross-look at its statute of 
limitations decisions manifests its desire to maintain consistency between 
separable, but related, parts of the procedural system. In sum, the results in 
Bernier are undoubtedly anomalous, but the decision is nevertheless a 
salutary one for both bench and bar. 
The second development in the area of the interest payable on judgments 
came by the addition of a new paragraph (f) to Rule 54 of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Civil Procedure. 31 The amendment effectively reverses the 
•• /d. at 963, 403 N.E.2d at 401. E.g., Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 89,223 
N.E.2d 807, 810 (1967); Walsh v. Curcio, 358 Mass. 819, 266 N.E.2d 895 (1971). But see 
Berkowitz v. Nee, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 834, 835, 351 N.E.2d 858, 859 (1916) (cannot add new 
plaintiffs by amendment after statute of limitations has expired). 
In Wadsworth, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the "running of the statute of limita-
tions is not a reason for denying an amendment, and may furnish a reason for allow1ng it." 
The Court also acknowledged that, on this point, Massachusetts practice was "more liberal 
than elsewhere." 352 Mass. at 88, 223 N.E.2d at 809-10. Compare, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 15(c). 
See Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying the Massachusetts practice, as 
opposed to Federal Rule 15, in a diversity action). Note that MASS. R. C1v. P. 15(c) may have 
further liberalized the practice. In Wadsworth the Court inquired into a limitation on the 
amendment to the pleadings, whether "the amendments resulted in the introduction of new 
causes of action against the added defendant." 352 Mass. at 89,223 N.E.2d at 810. SeeG.L. c. 
231, § 138 prior to its amendment by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 207. Rule 15(c), however, pro-
vides that the amendment relates back if it arises out of the same ''conduct, transaction, or oc-
currence" as the originaJ pleading. 
" MASS. R. C1v. P. 54(0, which was adopted April 18, 1980 and became effective July 1, 
1980, provides: 
Every judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest up to the date of pay-
ment of said judgment. Interest accrued up to the date of entry of a judgment shall be 
computed by the clerk according to law. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, interest 
from the date of entry of a judgment to the date of execution or order directing the pay-
52
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/12
§ 9.7 CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 381 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision a year earlier in Stokosa v. Wa/tuck. 32 In 
Stokosa, the superior court clerk added interest to a judgment in a tort ac-
tion from the "date of commencement of the action" 33 to the "time the 
judgment was entered. " 34 The plaintiff then sought, unsuccessfully, to 
compel the clerk to add interest for the three month period which had elaps-
ed between entry of the judgment and issuance of the execution. 3 ' On ap-
peal, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that under chapter 235, section 8, 
the plaintiff could collect interest up to the date the defendant actually paid 
the judgment. 36 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to 
give relief to the plaintiff, because the rules and statutes governing civil 
practice failed to require the court clerk to calculate interest up to the date 
the execution was issued by the court. 37 
The problem exposed in the Stokosa case became acute only with the 
adoption of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure in 1974. Rule 54(a) 
redefined "judgment" to mean the "act of the trial court finally adjudicat-
ing the rights of the parties," 38 which is a much earlier point in time than 
under the pre-rules practice. 39 By statute, however, executions cannot issue 
"until the exhaustion of all possible appellate review" of the judgment. 40 
Thus, a substantial gap may now exist between the judgment and 
execution. 41 
It is clear from the Stokosa opinion that the Court was unhappy with the 
result produced by the interplay of the applicable rules and statutes, and it 
ment of said judgment shall also be computed by the clerk, and the amount of such in-
terest shall be stated on the execution or order. 
Prior to its amendment, MASs. R. C1v. P. 54 governed entry of judgment and costs, but not in-
terest. See also the 1980 amendment to MASs. R. C1v. P. 54(d). 
" 378 Mass. 617, 393 N.E.2d 350 (1979). See Woodlinger & Kaplan, Civil Practice and Pro-
cedure, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, § 9.4. 
" G.L. c. 231, § 6B. 
,. G.L. c. 235, § 8. 
" 378 Mass. at 618, 393 N.E.2d at 351. 
•• /d. at 619, 393 N.E.2d at 351. 
" Id. at 621, 393 N.E.2d at 352. 
" MASs. R. C!V. P. 54(a). 
" See Reporters' Notes to MASS. R. C1v. P. 54, reprinted at J. Smith and H. Zobel, Rules 
Practice, 8 MASS. PRAC. S. 302; E. Swartz, eta/., 6 MASS. PLEADING & PRACfiCE, 54-3 to 54-4. 
•• G.L. c. 235, § 16, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 221 and Acts of 1975, c. 377, 
§ 117. Prior to its amendment, section 16 provided that executions could issue twenty-four 
hours after entry of judgment. 
" MASS. R. APP. P. 4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that 
In a civil case, unless otherwise provided by statute, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the lower court within thirty days of the date of the 
entry of the judgment appealed from; but if the Commonwealth or an officer or agency 
thereof is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within sixty days of 
such entry. 
Cf. G.L. c. 235, § 27 which provides, inter alia, that "[a)n original execution shall not issue 
after the expiration of one year after a party is entitled to take it out; .... " 
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referred the problem to its rules committee for resolution. 42 The new Rule 
54( f) is the product of that reference. Paragraph (f) directs the court clerk to 
include in the execution interest computed to the ''date of execution or 
order directing the payment of said judgment. " 43 The amended rule thus 
eliminates the gap in the enforcement of the plaintiff's right to interest 
which surfaced in the Stokosa litigation. Paragraph (f) also declares that the 
judgment creditor is entitled to interest "U'p to the date of payment" of the 
judgment. The amended rule does not, of course, directly assist in the col-
lection of interest which accrues after the execution is issued by the court 
because this sum cannot be calculated until the defendant pays the judg-
ment. 44 Presumably the plaintiff can secure enforcement of this obligation 
against a recalcitrant debtor under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 
69, although this point has never been directly decided. 4 ' 
The third development in the area of interest payable on judgments came 
from the Legislature, which increased the interest payable on judgments in 
both torts and contracts actions to ten percent. 46 This justifiable increase 
still leaves the interest paid on judgments below the contemporary cost of 
borrowing money, giving many defendants an unsalutary incentive to delay 
settlement of their disputes. The Legislature, however, has to balance this 
consideration against the potential unfairness of imposing higher interest 
costs against defendants who do not factor the marginal cost of borrowing 
money into their litigation decisions. More importantly, it is unfair to exact 
a heavy penalty from a defendant who reasonably seeks judicial resolution 
of a dispute at a time when our court system still cannot provide a trial 
promptly. 
" 378 Mass. at 618, 620, 393 N.E.2d at 350-51, 352 . 
., The phrase "or order directing the payment" presumably refers to subsequent judicial 
proceedings to enforce the judgment, such as supplementary process, G.L. c. 224, §§ 14 et seq. 
See also MASs. R. C1v. P. 69. 
" Cf. R. H. White Realty Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 371 Mass. 452,454, 358 
N.E.2d 440 (1976). 
" See Stokosa, 378 Mass. at 621-22, 393 N.E.2d at 352 ("It will be time enough to seek the 
exercise of the court's powers under Rule 69 if and when the need therefore is demonstrated. 
There has been no allegation and no proof in this case that the insurer will not meet its contrac-
tual and legal obligation to pay the amount of the judgment recovered against its insured, plus 
interest as provided by G.L. c. 235, § 8.") See also Geeshan v. Trawler Arlington, Inc., 371 
Mass. 815, 817-18, 359 N.E.2d 1276 (1976). 
" G.L. c. 231, §§ 6B, 6C, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 322, § 2. Section 3 provides the in-
creased interest rate applies only to actions commenced after the effective date of the statute. 
When the Legislature increased the rate of interest payable on judgments in torts actions in 
1974 (Acts of 1974, c. 224, § 1, amending G.L. c. 231, § 6B), it did not specify when the in-
crease was to go into effect. In Porter v. Clerk of the Superior Court, 368 Mass. 116, 330 
N.E.2d 206 (1975) the Court held the increase would apply to cases awaiting trial on the effec-
tive date of chapter 224, but that the lower interest rate would be used in pending cases for the 
period from the commencement of the action up to the effective date of the statutory increase. 
The Porter approach is preferable to the effective date specified by the Legislature in section 3, 
because it more quickly implements the increase across the board in a period of judicial 
backlogs when the statutory interest rate always seems to be lower than the market rate. 54
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§ 9.8. Waiver of Litigation Costs. The in forma pauperis statute1 pro-
vides for waiver by the court or payment by the state of litigation fees and 
costs, except attorney fees, for indigent litigants. Under the test set forth in 
the original in forma pauperis statute an indigent was: 
A person who is unable to pay the fees and costs of the proceeding in 
which he is involved, or is unable to do so without depriving himself 
or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter and 
clothing. 2 
Although this subjective standard was retained, the statute was amended 
during the Survey year to add two objective tests to determine whether a 
litigant is "indigent."3 First, the amendment provides that any recipient of 
"public assistance" 4 is an indigent person for whom litigation costs should 
be waived or paid. Alternatively, the amendment provides that a person 
whose after tax income does not exceed one hundred twenty-five percent of 
the federal poverty level' is also indigent for purposes of the statute. 6 
The amended statute also modifies the benefits available to indigent 
litigants. For example, "normal fees and costs"-where waiver or payment 
is mandatory-now include subpoena and witness fees for depositions and 
trial, jury fees, and removal fees. 7 "Extra fees and costs" -where waiver or 
payment is required only if the costs are "reasonably necessary" 8-now in-
clude transcription of depositions, "expert assistance," and appeal bonds. 9 
The amended statute still requires that an indigent litigant ''repay'' the 
court clerk any fees or costs which have been waived or paid under its provi-
sions. 10 This obligation exists, however, only in cases where the indigent 
§ 9.8. ' G.L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 539, §§5-9. The statute 
applies to civil, criminal, juvenile, and divorce proceedings in both the trial and appellate 
courts. G.L. c. 261, § 27B, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 6. For a statement of the law 
prior to enactment of the in forma pauperis statute, see Blazo v. Superior Court, 366 Mass. 
141, 315 N.E.2d 851 (1974). 
' G.L. c. 261, § 27A. 
' Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 5. 
• The amended statute defines public assistance as aid to families with dependent children 
(A.F.D.C.), general relief, veterans benefits, medicaid, and supplemental security income 
(S.S.I.) (Title XVI of the Social Security Act). G.L. c. 261, § 27A (para. l(a)) as amended. 
' Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, P.L. 88-452, § 625, 42 U.S.C. § 2971d (1976). 
• G.L. c. 261, § 27A (para. !(b)) as amended. 
7 G.L. c. 261, § 27A (para. 3), as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 5. 
' G.L. c. 261, § 27C (4). 
The court clerk is authorized to act on requests for waiver or payment of normal fees or 
costs "without hearing and without the necessity of appearance of any party or counsel" if the 
affidavit required by section 27B "appears regular and complete on its face and indicates that 
the affiant is indigent." G.L. c. 261, § 27C (2), as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 7. Other-
wise the matter goes before the court which may either grant the application or order a hearing. 
The application cannot be denied without hearing. See also G.L. c. 261, § 27D, as amended by 
Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 8, concerning the right to appeal a denial of an application under the in 
forma pauperis statute. 
• G.L. c. 261, § 27A(para. 4), as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 539, § 5. 
10 G.L. c. 261, § 27E. 55
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litigant recovers an amount which exceeds three times the amount of the 
benefits received under the in forma pauperis statute. The enforcement of 
the repayment obligation merits brief comment because it shifts the burden 
from the indigent litigant to the opposing party. The statute requires that 
the clerk must notify "all parties" to the lawsuit whenever the court or clerk 
authorizes waiver or payment of fees. Thereafter, if the indigent's recovery 
exceeds three times this sum, the judgment debtor must deduct the fees or 
costs from the judgment or settlement and deposit them with the clerk. The 
judgment debtor cannot pay the balance to the prevailing party (the in-
digent litigant) until the clerk notifies the parties that reimbursement has 
been made. If, however, thirty days elapse without any notification from 
the clerk, the judgment or settlement may be paid. 11 
§ 9.9. Court Rules-Uniform Summary Process Rules. The adoption of 
Uniform Summary Process Rules, effective September 1, 1980, 1 relieved 
landlord-tenant practicioners from the disparate practices which previously 
existed in different courts. 2 The need for a separate set of rules for summary 
process actions arose from the exclusion of these proceedings from the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The Uniform Rules now govern 
summary process actions in all departments of the Trial Court with jurisdic-
tion over proceedings under G.L. c. 239: the District Court (including the 
Boston Municipal Court), 4 the Housing Court, s and the Superior Court. 6 
One important feature of the Uniform Rules is that the point at which 
summary process actions go to trial will no longer vary from court to court. 
The new rules accomplish this uniformity by reintroducing the concept of 
the "entry date"' as the measuring point for all steps taken under the rules 
by either the plaintiff or the defendant. The landlord seeking to evict a ten-
ant first designates the entry date, which may be any Monday, 8 on the 
"Summary Process Summons and Complaint. " 9 The summons and com-
" /d. Section 27E expressly provides, however, that the failure to comply with its pro-
cedures does not relieve the indigent litigant of the repayment obligation. 
§ 9.9. ' 406-07 N.E.2d Mass. Dec. xxi (1980). See, e.g., 1980 MASs. LEGIS. SERV. (No. 4) 
803; 1981 DESK Copy: MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF COURT 349 (West 1981). 
2 See D!STIMUN CT. SUPP. R. 130; BOSTON HOUSING CT. R. FOR SUM. PRoc.; HAMPDEN 
HousiNG CT. R. The Superior Court Department had no summary process rules. 
' MASS. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(7). 
• G.L. c. 239, § 2. 
' G.L. c. 185, § 3. 
• G.L. c. 239, § 2. 
' UN!F. SUM. PROC. R. 2. The entry day is equivalent to the "return date" on the writs 
which were replaced by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 
' UN!F. SUM. PRoc. R. 2(c). The Reporters' Commentary to Rule 2 contains a succinct 
summary of how to commence an action. 
' The rules prescribe the form of the pleadings. 
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plaint then must be served on the tenant no less than seven days before the 
entry date. 10 The tenant's "Summary Process Answer" is due the Monday 
following the entry date, 11 and the trial is three days later, on a Thursday. 12 
Two other aspects of the Uniform Summary Process Rules are worthy of 
note. First, the rules permit the tenant to assert counterclaims if they are set 
forth in the answer. 13 Alternatively, because the use of counterclaims is per-
missive under the rules, the tenant may opt to assert the claims in an in-
dependent civil action against the landlord. 14 The disadvantage, from the 
tenant's perspective, of electing an independent action is that the claims 
then cannot be used to defeat the landlord's right to recover possession of 
the property in the summary process action. 15 The landlord does not have to 
file a responsive pleading to a counterclaim, 16 nor does the filing of a 
counterclaim by the tenant postpone the trial date. 17 
The second noteworthy feature of the Uniform Rules is that discovery in 
summary process actions is permitted as a matter of right. 18 Either party 
may initiate the discovery process by filing a "demand" for discovery by 
written interrogatories, 19 by a request for admissions, 20 or by a request for 
10 UNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 2(b), which also provides service may not be made either more than 
30 days prior to the entry day or until after any notice to terminate the tenancy has expired. See 
G.L. c. 186, §§ 11, 12. On the entry day the landlord must file the original Summary Process 
Complaint and return of service plus the notice of termination of the tenancy and any 
necessary certificates of compliance with local rent control or condominium conversion or-
dinances. UNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 2(d). 
" UNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. 3. A request to transfer the action to the Housing Court may be 
filed later. See text at note 26 infra. Transfer of the case postpones the trial date one week. 
UNIF. SuM. PROC. R. 4. 
" UNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. 2(c). The landlord must designate the trial date in the Summary Pro-
cess Summons and Complaint prior to service on the tenant. In the Superior Court Depart-
ment, however, the case is simply "added to the next non-jury list for assignment for trial." 
" UNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. 5 ("Counterclaims should be permitted in accordance with the pro-
visions of G.L. c. 239, § 8.") Counterclaims were not previously recognized by the District 
Court rules, see Dist./Mun. Cts. Suppl. R. 130, but tenants could counterclaim under the 
Housing Court rules. Boston Housing Ct. R. 3(a); Hampden Housing Ct. R. 3. 
14 UNIF. SuM. PRoc. R. 5. Compare MASS. R. C!V. P. 13. 
" See Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 202, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 
(1973); cf. G.L. c. 186, § 14. 
16 UNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 5. Compare MASS. R. CIV. P. 7(a) ("reply to a counterclaim 
denominated as such"). 
17 See UNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 3 and 5. Compare UNIF. SuM. PROC. R. 4 (trial postponed one 
week by transfer to Housing Court) and 7(b) (trial postponed two weeks by discovery demand). 
" UNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. 7. The Housing Courts, but not the District Courts, permitted 
discovery under the prior rules. BosTON HousiNG CT. R. 4 ("as a matter of course and not by 
leave of court"); HAMPDEN HoUSING CT. R. 8 (by order of court); DIST.IMUN. CTS. SUPP. R. 
130 (no reference to discovery). 
" See MASS. R. C1v. P. 33. 
20 See MASS. R. C1v. P. 36. 
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production of documents21 no later than the due date for the tenant's 
answer. 22 Although the Uniform Rules do not refer to oral depositions, the 
court should be able to allow oral depositions under the provision for "fur-
ther discovery ... on motion and for good cause shown. " 23 An important 
consequence of the use of discovery is that the trial date is postponed two 
weeks. 24 
There is a lacuna in the Uniform Rules for summary process actions 
which fall within the geographic jurisdiction of the state's two housing 
courts. 25 By statute,26 a tenant in Boston or Hampden County may, as a 
matter of right, transfer a summary process action filed in a district or 
superior court to the Housing Court. Rule 4 provides that the "transfer 
form" may be filed "no later than the day before the commencement of the 
trial," or Wednesday. A problem arises from Rule 3 which specifies that the 
tenant's answer must be filed on the Monday prior to the trial date, or two 
days before the transfer form is due. Since a default should be entered 
against a tenant who fails to file a timely answer, 27 the question arises 
whether a district or superior court clerk should honor a transfer request 
filed in compliance with Rule 4's deadline but which is not preceded by an 
answer under Rule 3. 
Although the Uniform Rules fail to address this problem, a refusal to 
transfer the case to the Housing Court under these circumstances is inap-
propriate for several reasons. The primary reason is that the rules 
themselves provide that the transfer form may be filed on Wednesday-or 
" See MAss. R. Civ. P. 34. 
21 UNIF. SuM. PROC. R. 7(a). 
" UNIF. SuM. PRoc. R. 7(a) para. 4. This interpretation would conform to the prior prac-
tice under HAMPDEN HousiNG CT. R. 8 (depositions by "special leave" of court). The Boston 
Housing Court previously allowed depositions as a matter of right. BosTON HousiNG CT. R. 4. 
Under MASs. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(ii) leave of court is required for depositions only if "there is no 
reasonable likelihood that recovery will exceed $5,000 if the Plaintiff prevails . . . . '' The prof-
fered interpretation may also be the only way to give meaning to the concluding sentence in 
Rule 7(a) para. 4. ("A request for discovery in response to an answer or counterclaim shall be 
deemed to establish good cause.") since the general rule is that "either party" may obtain 
discovery on "demand" (i.e., without showing good cause). On the other hand, this sentence 
may simply recognize the landlord is entitled to discovery under these circumstances even 
where his "demand" is filed late because the need for discovery did not arise until the tenant's 
answer was filed. 
" UNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 7(b). 
" See G.L. c. 185C, §§ 1, 3. 
" G.L. c. 185C, § 20. Section 20 literally provides that "any party" may transfer "[a)ny 
civil action within the jurisdiction of the housing court department which is pending in another 
court department .... " Thus, unlike the Uniform Rules, the statutory transfer provision is 
not limited to summary process actions. The discussion in the text refers to transfer by the ten-
ant because the landlord rarely wants to remove the summary process action from the forum he 
originally selected. 
" UNIF. SUM PRoc. R. lO(a). Rule lO(a) states that a "[d)efault shall be entered if a defend-
ant fails to answer .... " The specificity of the language ("answer") precludes an interpreta-
tion that the transfer form is a responsive pleading which, if filed before the deadline set by 
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two days after the answer is due-and do not expressly require that an 
answer be filed first. 28 A refusal to accept the transfer form under these cir-
cumstances would be especially anomalous because the rules disfavor 
defaults. Under Rule lO(c) a court must remove a default for failure to 
answer if the tenant appears in court on the trial date. Thus, since the rules 
themselves do not operate to deprive a tenant of a trial on the merits for 
failure to file a timely answer, they should not be applied to burden the 
statutory right to transfer. The absence of an answer, moreover, does not 
impose an additional burden on the landlord, because the filing of a 
transfer form delays the trial date one week. 29 If the tenant files an answer 
in the Housing Court the Monday following the transfer request, the 
landlord will receive the same notice of the tenant's defenses that the 
Uniform Rules provide in non-transfer cases. 30 
In sum, the proffered resolution of the lacuna surrounding the transfer 
provision is consistent with the terms of the new Uniform Summary Process 
Rules as well as with the prior practice in both the Boston and Hampden 
County Housing Courts. 31 It is also preferable to the alternative approaches 
to the transfer imbroglio created by the Uniform Rules. An interpretation 
which made filing an answer a condition precedent to a transfer under Rule 
4 would be an unjustified trap for the unwary litigant who relies on the 
deadline set by the rule. Such an interpretation would also seem inconsistent 
with the underlying rationale of the rules themselves, since it is difficult to 
define a reason for the separate deadlines set by the rules for answers and 
transfers apart from a desire to assure access to the Housing Court. 32 It 
Rule 4, avoids entry of a default. Contrast MASs. R. Civ. P. 12(a) ("responsive pleading," or 
Rule 12 motion, must be filed within 20 days) and MASs. R. Civ. P. 55 (default for failure to 
"plead or otherwise defend"). See also VNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. lO(c), discussed infra. 
" See VNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 3 and 4. 
" VNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 4 (" ... the clerk ofthe Housing Court division shall insure that the 
case is scheduled for the next succeeding hearing date .... "). 
•• See VNIF. SUM. PROC. R. 3. Note, however, that the express terms of Rule 3 do not allow 
this: "The answer shall be filed with the clerk and served on the plaintiff no later than the 
Monday preceding the date originally scheduled for trial." (emphasis added). The original trial 
date is the "second Thursday following the entry date," VNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. 2(c), and must 
be specified in the complaint. Reporter's Commentary to Rule 2. 
" BosTON HoUSING CT. R. 7 (may transfer case which is " 'pending,' i.e., either trial has 
not commenced or there has been no trial and judgment has not been entered"); HAMPDEN 
HouSING CT. R. 12 (may transfer "pending [case) (i.e., either trial has not commenced or an 
outstanding default exists)") (emphasis added). Accord UNIF. SuM. PRoc. R. lO(a), (c), and 
(d) (read together, these paragraphs provide that judgment enters on a default on the Friday 
after the original trial date). 
" There is also no purpose in requiring the landlord and tenant to appear before the district 
or superior court on the trial date where, by operation of VNIF. SUM. PRoc. R. lO(c), the 
default would be removed automatically. Rule lO(c) also requires that the trial date shall be 
postponed one week "[i]f the defendant appears but has failed to file an answer .... " Thus, 
both parties would end up in the same position as they would if the transfer had simply been 
allowed under Rule 4. See text at note 28 supra. 
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should be emphasized, however, that the proffered resolution is a stopgap 
measure until the Uniform Rules are amended to deal with this problem. 33 
§ 9.10. Court Rules-Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial 
Court also revised and reorganized its own rules during the Survey year, ef-
fective January 1, 1981. 1 The need for separate procedural rules had largely 
lapsed since practice before both the single justice and the full bench are 
now governed by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure2 and Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 3 Consequently, many of the old rules have been re-
pealed. The Supreme Judicial Court's rules are now substantially devoted to 
administrative matters, 4 including the regulation of the bar.' The revised 
rules also provide that the Massachusetts Rules of Civil, Criminal, and Ap-
pellate Procedure control in the event of any conflict with the Supreme 
Judicial Court's rules. 6 
" Judicial resolution of this matter is not desirable for two reasons. First, amendment 
should be quicker than awaiting an authoritative decision by the Appeals Court or Supreme 
Judicial Court. This is significant because in the interim inconsistent decisions by lower courts 
and individual judges will thwart the goal of uniform practice reflected in the rules. Second, an 
appellate court decision will not satisfy the goal of making basic rules of practice readily 
available in one place to litigants, their counsel, and judges. 
§ 9.10. ' 408-10 N.E.2d Mass. Dec. xxxvii (1980). See, e.g., 1980 MASs. LEGI~ SERV. (No. 
5) 1336 et seq.; 1981 DESK Copy: MASSACHUSEITS RULES OF COURT 195 et seq. (West 1981). 
' MASS. R. C1v. P. 1 But see S.J .C. RULES c. 1 (special rules for discovery, trustee process, 
and attachm~nts in proceedings not governed by Mass. R. Civ. P. or other rules); c. 2 (special 
rules for practice before single justice). 
' MASS. R. App. P. l(a). 
• E.g., S.J .C. RULE 1:08 (form, style and size of papers). 
' E.g., S.J.C. RULES 3:01 (admission to practice); 3:03 (law student practice); 3:05 (con-
tingent fees); 3:07 (canons of ethics). See also S.J.C. RULES c. 4 (bar discipline and clients' 
security protection). 
• S.J.C. RULE 1:01 (final para.), which also provides that rules adopted by the Appeals 
Court or departments of the Trial Court shall yield in the event of a conflict with the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil, Criminal, or Appellate Procedure. 
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